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A NOTE ON TERMS

There is an old joke about a poor tenant-farmer who stole a cow from his widelydisliked landlord. The evidence presented during the trial was overwhelming. There were
eye-witnesses, physical evidence, and even a confession. After a short deliberation, the
jury returned with the verdict, “Not-guilty, if he returns the cow.” This enraged the judge
and he launched into a lecture on the law, the clear evidence, and the unacceptable,
conditional nature of their verdict. He insisted that the jury return to deliberations to
further consider the case. The jury’s final verdict: “Fine. Keep the cow.”
The jury did not base its verdict on the facts or on the judge’s interpretation of the
law, but on external values and reasoning. In popular terminology, this was jury
nullification. In stricter legal terminology, the farmer's jury decided both questions of fact
and questions of law. Questions of fact are the factual peculiarities of the case - Did the
farmer take the cow? Did the farmer intend to permanently deprive the landlord of his
property? Questions of law are concerned with the application or interpretation of the law
- Does this behavior constitute legal theft?
This paper will use the term jury nullification. However, it should be noted that
this terminology is anachronistic to the period discussed in this paper, 1700 to 1850. In
the eighteenth-century, “question of law/fact” language or William Blackstone’s term
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“pious perjury” were most commonly used to describe acts of nullification. 1 While
Jeremy Bentham, in 1808, used “nullification” in reference to the judiciary making
“decision on grounds avowedly foreign to the merits,” the earliest use of “nullify” to
describe a jury action that I could locate was in Lysander Spooner’s 1852 treatise against
the Fugitive Slave Act.2 However, Spooner’s use did not gain traction. In 1895, the most
influential case on nullification in American jurisprudence, Sparf and Hansen v. United
States relied entirely on the questions of law and fact bifurcation. 3 In 1910, the dean of
Harvard Law School, Roscoe Pound, used the term "jury lawlessness” in lieu of
nullification.4 It seems the phrase “jury nullification” did not appear regularly until the
1930s.5 Nevertheless, for the sake of continuity and ease of comprehension, this paper
will use the ahistorical shorthand of jury nullification.

1

In 1670, Bushell’s Case, the legal origins of nullification, used the question of law / question of fact
terminology, which remains popular in the legal field. See Bushell’s Case (1670), 124 E.R. 1006. In 1769,
William Blackstone coined “pious perjury” to describe the behavior of a jury that convicted on lesser
charges, despite the evidence, to avoid punishments deemed overly harsh. See William Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England: In Four Books; With an Analysis of the Work, ed. A. Ryland
(London: Raynor and Hodges, 1836), 239.
2
Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. "nullification, n.,"accessed March 06, 2021, https://www-oedcom.elib.uah.edu/view/Entry/129057?redirectedFrom=nullification. In 1852, Lysander Spooner stated,
“This minority would disregard, trample upon, or resist, the execution of such legislation, and then throw
themselves upon a jury of the whole people for justification and protection. In this way all legislation
would be nullified, except the legislation of that general nature which impartially protected the rights...”
See Lysander Spooner, An Essay on the Trial by Jury, (Boston: John P. Jewett and Company, 1852) 220.
3
Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. at 51 (1895).
4
Roscoe Pound, “Law in Books and Law in Action,” American Law Review 44, no. 12, (1910): 18.
5
Jerome Michael and Herbert Wechsler, “A Rationale of the Law of Homicide II,” Columbia Law Review
XXXVII, no. 8 (1937): 1265; Livingston Hall, “Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes,” Harvard
Law Review 48, no. 5 (Mar., 1935): 751.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

On February 7th, 1794, Chief Justice John Jay delivered the only jury instructions
ever recorded in the Supreme Court.1 Georgia v. Brailsford is noteworthy simply due to
the extreme rarity of a Supreme Court jury trial. However, the content of Jay’s
instructions makes Brailsford all the more intriguing. The case’s most famed distinction
was the Chief Justice's provocative message that acknowledged the jury’s right to
“determine the law as well as the fact.”2 Brailsford served as a thorny precedent, in the
following century, where the judiciary grew increasingly antagonistic towards
jury-determined law, nullification. To reckon Jay’s controversial language with the
judiciary’s growing consensus that there was no right of nullification, Brailsford was
simply ignored by some judges; Others explained Brailsford as a recording inaccuracy,
labeled it an “anomaly,” and chalked the case up as a simple holdover of revolutionary
passions.3 Ultimately, one hundred and one years later, the Supreme Court reversed

1

Lochlan F. Shelfer, “ Special Juries in the Supreme Court,” The Yale Law Journal, 123, no. 1 (October,
2013): 211.
2
Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. at 3 (1794), (“You have nevertheless a right to take upon yourselves to judge
of both, and to determine the law as well as the fact in controversy... on the one hand, it is presumed, that
juries are the best judges of facts; it is, on the other hand, presumable, that the court are the best judges of
law. But still both objects are lawfully, within your power of decision”).
3
United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835); United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. at 1334
(D. Mass. 1851); Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. at 140; Donald M. Middlebrooks, "Reviving
Thomas Jefferson's Jury: Sparf and Hansen v. United States Reconsidered," The American Journal of Legal
History 46, no. 4 (2004): 388.
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Brailsford and redefined nullification as an unauthorized power, not a “legal or moral
right” in Sparf and Hansen v. United States.4
The Supreme Court acknowledged that there were limits to how Sparf could be
enforced. The Court begrudgingly stated juries continued to hold a “physical power” to
nullify because there was little a judge could do about a jury deadset to nullify.5 Juries
cannot be compelled to provide reasoning for a verdict. As a result, a simple “not-guilty”
based on the facts (legal right under Sparf) is indistinguishable from a simple “not-guilty”
based on the law (illegal power under Sparf.) However, the change from a “right” to a
“power” was more than a semantic change. For example, the Court could now forbid the
encouragement of nullification from defense attorneys and could explicitly instruct the
jury on the limits of its decision-making power. While the jury remained physically
capable of nullification, the distinction allowed for much greater restrictions.6
Sparf illustrated how the bench, as well as the social, class, and racial power
structures that act upon the bench, viewed “the people” and their participation in
government. The shift in meaning was a reflection of the changing roles of judges and
juries. Nullification as a right was a position that valued local knowledge and community
standards. It feared government overreach more than underhanded citizens. It prioritized
mercy over uniformity of punishment. On the other hand, nullification as a power
emphasized certainty and market efficiencies created by known outcomes and fixed costs.
By 1895, proponents of nullification as a power understood the dangers of the justice
system to be unreasonable jurors, not unreasonable laws.
4

Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S., 74.
Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S., 84.
6
For example, it allows judges to ban defense attorneys from even discussing the topic with a jury. See
Nancy J. King, “Silencing Nullification Advocacy inside the Jury Room and outside the Courtroom,”
The University of Chicago Law Review 65, no. 2 (Spring, 1998).
5
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This work explores why and how this shift occurred. Other legal-history
scholarship on nullification has centered the judiciary: its case opinions, its shifting
relationship with the jury, and the emergence of a professional identity. This scholarship
forms what I call the traditional court-focused narrative. These scholars have examined
the change from Brailsford to Sparf by concentrating on the role the judiciary played.
The court-focused narrative examines a nearly identical chronology of court cases:
seventeenth-century origins; eighteenth-century colonial developments; and the
nineteenth-century judge-led constraints.
Nullification attracts extraordinary notice. To begin with, all jury actions are very
public. The verdict itself, as Michel Foucault has argued, was designed to be observed.
The “spectacle of the scaffold” was replaced with the theatrics of sentencing.7 Effective
punishment requires an audience whose attention peaks with the verdict. Then,
nullification adds something even more “spectacular” than the performative aspects of
the ordinary trial. It has the unexpected. In cases of nullification, the jury is presented
with the law, the facts, and the clear guilt of a defendant. A guilty verdict should be
perfunctory. Expectations are set. Yet, instead of conviction, the jury acquits a killer with
one-hundred eye-witnesses or a horse thief caught in the saddle.8 Nullification is an event
that commands a response beyond the judiciary.

7

Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage
Books, 1977) 32-35.
8
North Carolina Spectator and Western Advertiser (Rutherfordton, North Carolina), November 19, 1830;
The Democrat (Huntsville, Alabama) December, 16, 1830; The New American Magazine (Woodbridge,
NJ), September, 1758, in Vol. XX, Archives of the State of New Jersey, eds. William Nelson, Garrett D. W.
Vroom, William S. Stryker, Austin Scott, and Francis B. Scott (Paterson, N.J.: The Call Printing and
Publishing Company, 1898), Extracts from American Newspapers, Relating to New Jersey. 1704-1775,
657-658.

3

Spectacular trials become points of cultural reference. Nullification creates a
tension between the jury and judicial and legislative authority, embodied by the thwarted
law, that has to be explained by judges and the public alike. This work considers those
non-judicial explanations from 1700 to 1850; how colonial executives, American
legislatures, and the public understood acts of nullification.
Jury nullification was part of a dynamic and evolving meaning-making process.
Early eighteenth-century observers tended to classify acts of nullification as anecdotal
events placed in a strict socio-moral framework. This framework viewed nullification as
a result of external forces (skilled defense attorneys, reviled prosecutors, and charming
defendants) or the moral character of the jury. Revolution brought about a radical new
vision of nullification that abandoned earlier conventions. Beginning in the 1750s and
1760s, nullification was understood in a new hyper-political way that emphasized jury
agency and independence. By the 1820s and 1830s, the public returned to a socio-moral
understanding of nullification, but retained a jury-centered focus. Once again, acts of
nullification were explained as a consequence of emotional responses and social
connections to the involved parties. I contend that the renewed socio-moral framework
allowed nullification to serve as a site of self-definition for the judiciary. The judiciary
used the invasion of the other, the nullifying jury, to develop its own professional identity.
Every emotional, unregulated, morally-impassioned jury action helped the Bench
self-identify as a logical, rational, steady-hand. This is not to suggest a true alternative
narrative to court-focused narratives, but only to further define and illuminate the text and
context of the judiciary’s rejection of nullification within the narrative.

4

1.1 THE COURT-FOCUSED NARRATIVE

The court-focused narrative concludes that the decline of jury power was
judge-led. The narrative begins with nullification’s ideological and legal underpinnings of
nullification with the English trials of John Lilburne(1649) and William Penn(1670).9 The
spectacle of nullification was on full display in Leveller, John Lilburne’s treason trial.
Lilburne represented himself in a spirited trial closely followed by the public. He made
unprecedented demands, including an insistence that the jury could determine questions
of law and of fact.10 John Lilburne invited the jury to challenge judicial control and the
judiciary’s contended monopoly on reason and sound judgment. With his defense, the
“seeds of the jury's authority to decide for itself how the law should be applied were
planted.”11 The jury agreed and acquitted.
The trial of John Lilburne was nullification’s ideological beginnings. However, its
legal underpinnings began when William Penn and William Mead were charged with
9

See Albert W. Alschuler and Andrew G. Deiss, "A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United
States," The University of Chicago Law Review 61, no. 3 (1994): 902; Douglas G. Smith, "The Historical
and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform," Hofstra Law Review 25, no. 2 (1996): 416; Stephan
Landsman, “The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated History,” Hastings Law Journal 44,
no. 3 (1993): 590; David A. Pepper, “Nullifying History: Modern-Day Misuse of the Right to Decide the
Law,” Case Western Reserve Law Review 50, no. 3 (2000): 610; Alan Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, “Jury
Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy,” Law and Contemporary Problems, 43 no. 4 (1980): 56; and
Mark DeWolfe Howe, “Juries as Judges of Criminal Law,” Harvard Law Review 52, no. 4 (1939): 583.
10
John Lilburne, The Trial of L[ieut]. C[ollonel]. John Lilburne, by an Extraordinary or Special
Commission, of Oyer and Terminer at the Guild-Hall of London, the 24, 25, 26. of Octob. 1649 Being as
Exactly ... and Taken in Short Hand as It Was Possible to Be Done in Such a Crowd and Noise and
Transcribed with an Indifferent and Even Hand, Both in References to the Court and the Prisoner, That No
Matter of Fact, as It Was There Disclosed, Might Truly Come to Publick View. : In Which Is Contained All
the Judges Names, and the Names of the Grand Inquest, and the Names of the Honest Jury of Life and
Death : Vnto Which Is Annexed a Necessary and Essential Appendix …, (St. Thomas: Hen. Hils, 1649),
121.
11
Andrew D. Leipold, "Rethinking Jury Nullification," Virginia Law Review 82, no. 2 (1996): 285; See also
Shannon C. Stimson, The American Revolution and the Law: Anglo-American Jurisprudence before John
Marshall, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), 18.
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unlawful assembly, twenty years later. The prominent London Quakers were clearly
culpable. Despite the clear evidence, the jury refused to find the defendants guilty.12
Insisting on a guilty verdict, the judge sent the jury back to the juryroom. For two days
the court withheld food, water and heat, “without so much as a chamber pot.”13 When the
jury still refused to convict, the judge accepted the verdict, but charged all of the jurors
for returning a verdict contrary to the evidence. The jurors were ordered to Newgate jail
until they paid a fine.14
Most paid the fine, but Edward Bushell and three others refused and obtained a
writ of habeas corpus from the Court of Common Pleas. The litigation that arose from
the writ became known as the Bushell’s Case. The judge, Sir John Vaugn, held that jurors
may not be fined or imprisoned for returning a verdict in conflict with the evidence. This
was not a defense of nullification, but it did establish a legal precedent that would provide
a shield for nullification. Vaughn’s comments rendered nullification “virtually impossible
to prevent.”15 It was not sanctioned behavior, but the consequences were removed.
Thomas A. Green argued that the Bushell’s Case had little effect on the day-to-day
administration of criminal law in England.16 The English courts simply exercised the
option of retrial when a case was decided against the facts. While jurors were no longer
12

(This prompted the trial’s Recorder, Sir John Howell’s infamous observation: "Till now I never
understood the reason of the policy and prudence of the Spaniards, in suffering the[I]nquisition among
them.")William Penn, The peoples ancient and just liberties asserted in the tryal of William Penn, and
William Mead, at the sessions held at the Old-Baily in London, the first, third, fourth and fifth of Sept. 70.
against the most arbitrary procedure of that court, (London: s.n., 1670), 20.
13
Penn, The peoples ancient and just liberties asserted in the tryal of William Penn, and William Mead, at
the sessions held at the Old-Baily in London, the first, third, fourth and fifth of Sept. 70. against the most
arbitrary procedure of that court, 18.
14
Julius J. Marke, "The Trial of William Penn," Litigation 6, no. 1 (1979). See also, Bushell's Case, 124
Eng. Rep. 1006.
15
Simon Stern, "Between Local Knowledge and National Politics: Debating Rationales for Jury
Nullification after Bushell's Case," The Yale Law Journal 111, no. 7 (2002): 1817. See Also; Barry R.
Nager,"The Jury That Tried William Penn," American Bar Association Journal 50, no. 2 (1964).
16
Thomas Andrew Green, Verdict According to Conscience: Perspectives on the English Criminal Trial
Jury, 1200-1800, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 201.
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sent to prison, the English common law clearly established that questions of facts were
the purview of the jury, and questions of law belonged to the judge. By 1895, the same
division was firmly established in American law. 17 However, there was a period in the
colonial era continuing into the nineteenth-century where the American boundaries of
jury and judge were contested.
The final period in the court-focused narrative is the nineteenth-century growth of
judicial power and the judge-led condemnation of nullification. Beginning with United
States v. Battiste in 1835, a series of cases denied a jury’s right to nullify, including:
Commonwealth v. Porter (1845), United States v. Morris (1851), and Commonwealth v.
Anthes (1855). These cases made several common arguments against nullification. First,
most held that juries lacked the skill and wisdom to determine questions of law.18 Second,
juries were too susceptible to the influence of passion and as a result failed to always
follow the law.19 Finally, each case emphasized the value of certainty in verdicts. In civil
cases, commercial interests needed to be able to predict court decisions to be able to
make informed choices. In criminal cases, potential criminals needed to know their
conviction would be inevitable, for their fear of conviction to function as a deterrent.20
The judiciary’s position was well established by the 1850s. Between 1850 and
1931, eleven state courts concluded that juries had no right to nullify, a position the

17

Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51.
United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas., 1043 (“a jury may...choose, from wantonness, or ignorance, or
accidental mistake, to interpret it), Commonwealth v. Anthes, 71 Mass 191 (“requires not only wisdom and
integrity, but the most thorough experience and skill in law as a science.”).
19
Commonwealth v. Porter 51 Mass 279 (Juries may not “make the law paramount and supreme over all
the powers and influences of will or passion, of interest or prejudice”); Commonwealth v. Porter 51 Mass
(10 Metcalf) at 280 (Juries “may be influenced by more base, interested and vindictive passions.”).
20
United States v. Battiste; Commonwealth v. Porter; Commonwealth v. Anthes, 71 Mass 196; and United
States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1336.
18
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Supreme Court would also hold in Sparf [1895].21 The attention given to these cases is
not unwarranted; many are drafted by the century’s most prominent judges: Lemuel
Shaw, Joseph Story, and John Marshall Harlan II. However, the focus on judicial opinions
has perhaps too narrowly shaped the historiography of nullification.

1.2 THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF NULLIFICATION

The two central debates about the decline of jury independence in the
nineteenth-century are the inter-related questions of why and when. What was the
underlying cause and when did it occur? Scholars typically attribute the rise of judicial
professionalism to four major contributors: the adoption of legal positivism, the increased
influence of commercial interest, and effects of urbanization and democratization.
Many scholars argue the nineteenth-century professionalization of the American
judiciary led to the reduction of the power of the jury. They attribute eighteenth-century
tolerance to the fact that colonial juries and judges were ill-informed on the law. For
much of the period, both judges and juries worked cooperatively with little imperial
oversight. Shannon Stimson and Forrest McDonald have posited that juries filled a
colonial need for alternative authorities that dissipated with independence.22 Without a
British foil, jury nullification was losing its legitimacy and American judges stepped in
with a new justification for authority, expertise. By the 1820s a new generation of judges,

21

Douglas G. Smith, "The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform," Hofstra Law Review 25,
no. 2 (1996): 451 (noting that Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New York,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia rejected the notion that juries had the power to decide
issues of law). See also, Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51.
22
Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution, (Lawrence:
University of Kansas Press, 1985); Stimson, The American Revolution and the Law: Anglo-American
Jurisprudence before John Marshall.
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like James Kent and Joseph Story, “emphasized technical expertise in the special
requirements of the law.”23
The emergence of a more technical view of the law coincided with the growing
sophistication of American legal education. Matthew Harrington noted the symbiotic
relationship between these two occurrences. A more complicated law required a more
specialized legal practitioner, who could create even more complex laws. Ultimately, the
growing sophistication of legal education led to a greater confidence and uniformity
within the profession.24 It became increasingly clear, at least to the judiciary, that their
profession was uniquely qualified to answer questions of law.
After the rise of judicial professionalism, the second popular explanation of the
decline of jury power is a change in judicial ideology. How judges understood the nature
of law changed. Two ideologies became increasingly influential in the
nineteenth-century: legal positivism and instrumentalism. Legal positivism views the law
as a man-made tool for social purposes, as opposed to a natural law. Instrumentalism,
builds on legal positivism, and promotes creative interpretations of texts to further social
good. One the one hand, instrumentalist beliefs made judges “increasingly willing to
devise some means to force juries to adhere to the law.”25 However, it also legitimately
made law more complicated and made specialty knowledge more necessary. Legal
positivism and instrumentalism required an active participatory judiciary or the
oft-derided modern term: judicial activism.

23

Stimson, The American Revolution and the Law: Anglo-American Jurisprudence before John Marshall,
154.
24
Harrington, "The Law-Finding Function of the American Jury," 380.
25
Harrington, "The Law-Finding Function of the American Jury," 379.
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For example, one consequence of the application of legal positivism was the
decline of the enforcement of technicalities. The judiciary abandoned court precedents
and black letter interpretations of the law to prevent small technicalities from determining
the outcome of the case.26 From a natural law position, judicial intervention of
technicalities was unacceptable. Yet, for a legal positivist, the greater goal of justice
demanded technicalities be overruled. However, who had the power to overrule was
limited. The judge had the requisite knowledge and temperament to intervene, not the
jury. Nullification threatened to contradict that learned judgment. As a result, not only did
the ideologies grant the judiciary permission to limit jury independence, it mandated it.
One of the most pervasive arguments for the judiciary’s rejection of nullification
was the growing influence of commercial interests. Morton J. Horwitz, in his seminal
work, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, posited that the "subjugation of
juries" was a consequence of the rise of instrumentalism and the influence of commercial
interests on the courts. 27 Commercial interests desired limiting unfavorable jury verdicts,
uniform and predictable commercial law, and creative solutions to precommerical legal
doctrines that limited industry. Commercial interests and the judiciary viewed a powerful
jury and the right of nullification as obstacles to those desires. Predictable outcomes and
fixed legal costs made it easier to operate a business. It reduced risk and absolute costs.
Stephan Landsman has argued the judiciary came to view the jury as too anti-corporate
and lacked the necessary sophistication to determine questions of law in commercial
conflicts.28
26

Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, (Cambridge, Harvard University
Press, 1977), 29.
27
Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 140-59.
28
Stephan Landsman, “The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated History,” Hastings Law
Journal 44, no. 3 (1993).
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Finally, continued urbanization and the changing demographics of juries
influenced how the judiciary responded to juries and to nullification. Over the course of
the nineteenth-century, jury pools expanded. After the American Revolution, state by
state, unpropertied white men increasingly gained access to the jury box. Alschuler and
Deiss drew a provocative correlation: “As the jury's composition became more
democratic, its role in American civic life declined.” 29
Urbanization also played a role in the decline of jury power. The value of
jury-lawfinders had been their local knowledge. They knew the parties and the
community standards. Most importantly, the jury and judges' worldviews were generally
aligned. Urbanization ended this historically-celebrated jury-contribution. In the
nineteenth-century urban court cases, judges, defendants and juries were increasingly
unknown to each other. The judiciary viewed an unknown nineteenth-century jury less
trustingly than the century’s past jury of local landowning neighbors.
Matthew Harrington and William E. Nelson attributed the rejection of
nullification rights to rapid industrialization and the increasing diversity of juries.30 Both
were not simply identifying generalized class or ethnic anxiety on behalf of judges. Each
viewed “common values and social stability” as required elements for a law-finding
jury.31 Nineteenth-century immigration, urbanization, and the loosening of jury
requirements meant that “juries could no longer be counted on to speak from a common
set of beliefs and experiences.”32
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Scholars also dispute the timing of the shift away from jury independence.
Horwitz placed the change earlier than most at the turn of the nineteenth century. Forrest
McDonald and Larry Kramer dated the change to the 1820s and 1830s, while Mark
DeHowe, Alschuler, and Deiss have placed it in the second half of the
nineteenth-century.33 Yet, Matthew Harrington identified the end of the nineteenth
century as the point of decline and instead viewed the Jacksonian Era as a period of peak
jury power.34
Taken collectively, much of the scholarly work has focused on a very narrow field
of inquiry, which may explain the continued dissatisfaction. In 1975, Harold Hyman and
Catherine Tarrant began their own discussion of American juries bemoaning that
"research into American jury history has been far from adequate, systematic, or
synthetic.”35 Twenty years later, Albert Alschuler and Andrew G. Deiss remained
unsatisfied by the “astonishing scholarly neglect” regarding American juries. 36 Again, in
1996, Douglas G. Smith asserted, “surprisingly little has been written about the historical
development of the American jury.” 37 These works all understand jury nullification and
more generally-speaking, the gradual disappearance of jury independence, as a judge-led
and judge-center process.38 This paper suggests that a cultural approach, examining
sources outside the judiciary, can add clarity to the questions of causation and timing.
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1.3 ARGUMENTS, METHODS, SCOPE AND SOURCES

My work uncovers two reasons to question the court-focused narrative. First, the
traditional narrative failed to distinguish between early and later colonial juries. I find a
lack of continuity from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century. Second, I argue against
the presumption that the change in nullification’s legal status was judge-led. I argue that
the renewed socio-moral framework led to the diminishing power of the jury over the
course of the nineteenth-century, particularly with regards to nullification, and shaped the
judiciary itself.
I come to these conclusions when other scholars have not, because I am looking at
sources outside the case-based narrative, often ignored in discussions of nullification. I
examined newspapers, legislative records, journals and personal letters. These sources
suggest an alternative explanation for the diminishing power of the jury: an explanation
that does not focus on how the law or judiciary evolved, but on the changing cultural
understanding of the jury. Also, the inclusion of new materials, some entirely unnoticed
in other works, create a counter periodization to the court-focused narrative.
Locating nullification sources is challenging. First, colonial court records are
often undetailed and incomplete. Daniel David Blinka attributes this as a consequence of
the face-to-face nature of colonial courts.39 Cases were resolved quickly with all parties
present which limited the need for comprehensive note-keeping. For many cases, little
more than the parties, the nature of the dispute, and the verdict were recorded. Without
information concerning legal arguments or submitted evidence, it is difficult to identify
acts of nullification.
39
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Second, even when legal arguments and evidence are in the records, the very
specific information needed for nullification is missing: the reasoning of the jury. A
not-guilty verdict based on the facts looks exactly like a not-guilty verdict based on a
rejection of existing law. P.J.R. King notes, "[e]ighteenth century jurors have left virtually
no records of their opinions.”40 Attempting to separate the nullification-based decisions
from the potentially fact-based decisions results in only the most obvious and flagrant
cases being considered. The most brazen acts of nullification provoked the most
impassioned responses. Nonetheless, by consistently looking at the reactions to extreme
cases, the evolution of the public’s perception of juries and nullification becomes clear.
Third, in the 1760s and 1770s the “law” became increasingly ambiguous, and so
unavoidably, determining acts of nullifying the “law” is difficult. John Phillip Reid
argued that after 1764, colonists and Britain “no longer agreed on the definition of “law”
itself.”41 He posited that local laws and Whig political theory were at irreconcilable odds
with imperial law. He further complicated the issue by noting that the British imperial
law was often “unclear” and “contradictory.”42 The Whig position was that when the
government overstepped its constitutional power, the jury was to act as a “shield against
tyranny.”43 How does one assess a jury verdict in this environment? What of a case where
a juror believed he had followed local law and the colonial governor believed the juror
had nullified the imperial law? We are perhaps saved from answering this question
because Revolutionary-era juries and the public answered it for us: It was nullification.
40
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Those revolutionary juries are the focus of Chapter Two which examines sites of
colonial nullification in order to discredit the court-focused narrative’s premise of
eighteenth-century continuity. This chapter traces the public discussions of a single
example of nullification, the 1734 libel trial of John Peter Zenger over a period of
one-hundred years. I examine newspaper responses to the trial starting with the initial
analysis in the 1730s and 1740s, to the revival in the 1770s, and ending with the gradual
fade from public memory in the early nineteenth-century. Each generation made meaning
of the Zenger verdict based on its larger understanding of nullification. It is clear that the
Zenger verdict was originally understood in the early colonial socio-moral framework,
but was reimagined as a political act in the 1770s. I explore the political re-coding of
nullification in the second half of the eighteenth-century. Finally, Chapter Two considers
the Philadelphia treason trials as a moment of peak politicization of jury nullification.
Chapter Three considers the transition back to a socio-moral understanding of
nullification in the nineteenth-century. It examines the themes of social connection, moral
character, and emotionality in the descriptions of juries and nullification. It concludes by
discussing how those themes influenced the major cases of the court driven narrative, the
law, and judicial identity.
My final chapter investigates the interrelationship of law, language, and judicial
identity. Chapter Four is a case study of the extra-judicial discussions of nullification in
Alabama from 1824 to 1839. These discussions were part of a fifteen year public debate
on penitentiary reform. I examined the language of nullification-explanations found in
legislative sessions, newspapers, and in private writings. I then suggest how this language
influenced Alabama’s criminal law and shaped the judiciary’s self-image. The judiciary
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used the emotional and passionate jury to construct its own counter image of reserve and
rationality. Also, it is noteworthy that the Alabama sources have not been thoroughly
examined within the context of nullification before. The chapter uses alternative sources
to add greater context to the evolution of jury independence in the nineteenth-century.

1.4 CONCLUSION

In linguistics, a word has great resonance when changing one unit of meaning
forces a change within the entire field.44 It is my intention in the following chapters to
illustrate the great resonance of nullification. When the meaning of nullification changed,
so did an entire nation. The reimaginings of nullification stirred larger reimaginings about
the nature of participatory democracy, the judiciary, and the law.
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CHAPTER 2. THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY JURY

In October of 1682, Edward Randolph, operating as the Commissioner of
Customs, brought charges against the Scotch ketch, George. The George had entered into
trade along the Piscataqua River in New Hampshire, but was not an English ship, as
required under the Navigation Acts. Randolph seized the ship and informed the Governor
and local port captain. With little local support, the ship escaped without interference
weeks before the trial date. Nevertheless, the trial continued sans defendant and an
affidavit was submitted by a port official that no certificate was produced, as was
required by law. The law and evidence was clear, yet, the jury found the defendant
“not-guilty.”
According to Randolph, the George case was part of a “thriving practice of Juries
finding agst. His Matie. in plaine cases, wherin law and Evidence direct the contrary.”45
His letters mentioned dozens of similar cases. Some even resulted in monetary damages
assessed against the Crown and Randolph personally, a consequence unauthorized by any
imperial law. On the surface, this looked exactly like Boston’s reaction eighty years later
to the 1764 Sugar Act: An imperial monetary law widely and flagrantly ignored, where
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juries refused to convict even in straight-forward cases. However, jury nullification was
understood quite differently in 1680 than it would be in 1764.
In the beginning of the eighteenth-century, acts of nullification were not explained
as overt political acts by the jury. For example, nullification was attributed to the skill of
a persuasive lawyer, or charm of a defendant. The jury was understood to be a passive
participant in the act. On other occasions, nullification was understood as a result of the
jury’s moral failings through dishonesty or self-dealings. Nullification was not read as an
act of political agency. However, by the middle of the century, the cultural understanding
of nullification changed. By the Revolution, acts of nullification were interpreted as
jury-centered, overtly political actions that safeguarded citizens against legislative and
judicial oppression.
This cultural evolution of nullification stands in stark opposition to the continuity
argued by the court-focused narrative. That argument sees the eighteenth-century as a
period of active, politically-motivated jurors operating in the face of sympathetic local
judges and frustrated colonial administrators. The court-focused narrative sees continuity
because of the continuity in judicial reactions to nullification. However, nullification and
the law more generally, can be viewed as a decentralized process that looks beyond the
judiciary and recognizes the role of the public. From this position, eighteenth-century
nullification was a period of turbulent reimaginings.
A variety of turbulent reimaginings can be found with an examination of a single
case of nullification, the 1734 libel trial of John Peter Zenger. In the chapter, I trace
accounts of Zenger from the contemporaneous descriptions in the 1730s to the later
discussions in the 1770s, 1780s, and beyond. Each reimagining revealed the shifting
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perceptions of jury nullification. Subtle changes in each re-telling of Zenger can reveal
larger changes. Using a single point of reference makes the trend from socio-moral
passivity to political agency particularly clear. The second section considers other early
colonial descriptions of nullification in order to further delineate the public’s
understanding of nullification. In the final section, I explore the political re-coding of
nullification in the second half of the eighteenth-century. My purpose in this chapter is to
reject arguments of eighteenth-century continuity, highlight the significance of
contemporary nullification discussions outside of the judiciary, and demonstrate the
connection between the evolving public descriptions of nullification with its level of
perceived political legitimacy.

2.1 THE ZENGER TRIAL: A BELLWETHER FOR NULLIFICATION

In 1734, John Peter Zenger printed a series of political attacks about the Governor
of New York in The New York Weekly Journal. Under English law, it was a crime to
publish statements critical of the government and Zenger was charged with seditious
libel. The possible truth of the criticism was not an accepted defense, evident by the
English common law maxim “The greater the truth, the greater the libel.”46 According to
the prosecution and existing law, the only issue of fact for the jury to determine was
whether Zenger was the publisher, a fact that Zenger’s attorney, Andrew Hamilton
conceded. Hamilton also insisted that the truth of the publication was a valid defense and
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that the jury “had the right beyond all dispute to determine both the law and the fact” - to
accept the truth defense.47 The jury apparently accepted Hamilton’s arguments and its
acquittal of Zenger and brought “three huzzas” from courtroom on-lookers.48 This verdict
against the facts and existing law was one of many acts of jury nullification in colonial
America.
All subsequent writings on Zenger were based on the only first-hand account
recorded of the trial. James Alexander, likely based on Andrew Hamilton’s trial notes,
wrote the account: A Brief Narrative of the Case and Trial of John Peter Zenger, Printer
of the New York Weekly Journal. The recently freed Zenger immediately published the
account in 1736.49 Alexander’s account and its derivatives regularly appeared in
newspapers and pamphlets throughout England and its colonial holdings for over a
century.50 In the first fifty-years, a pamphlet recounting the events of the trial was
republished fourteen times in America, more than any formal legal treatise. One historian
described it as “the American primer of the role and duty of juries.” 51 Over the course of
one-hundred years, it was retold, critiqued, applauded, and eventually aged into
insignificance. The popularity of Zenger and the single origin source, makes the trial
uniquely useful in tracking the politicization of the American jury and the valorization of
nullification that occurred in the latter half of the eighteenth-century.
The newspapers and pamphlets of the 1730s and 1740s were the first to analyze
Zenger. These accounts focused on Zenger’s defense attorney, Andrew Hamilton.
47
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Hamilton’s supporters praised his “Effect upon the Jury.”52 While his critics bemoaned
his “dexterity in captivating them.”53 In these early descriptions, the jury took a passive
role in the nullification. In a sense, the jury delivered the verdict, but Hamilton had
delivered the jury.
In March of 1738, The Pennsylvania Gazette explained the verdict: “This Speech,
together with his other Pleadings, had such an Effect upon the Jury, that They took but
little Time to consider of their Verdict, and brought in Mr. Zenger NOT GUILTY.”54 Jury
nullification occurred because of the power and influence of Hamilton’s speech. The jury
has not acted, but has been acted upon. Hamilton had an “Effect” on them. Later in the
article, Hamilton was described as a “learned Gentleman” who earned “immortal honour”
with the verdict.55 The clear hero of the Zenger trial was Hamilton.
In the same paper, two months later, an article discussed the letters people
received from Ireland and England since the news of the trial had spread. It was
mentioned that the Trial of John Peter Zenger was reprinted four times in three months
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and that Hamilton is viewed “as a glorious Asserter of Public Liberty and of the Rights
and Privileges of Britons.”56 The praise heaped upon Hamilton was fawning:
Mr. Hamilton has acquired a high reputation at home, on account
of his learned and generous defense of the RIGHTS of Mankind…
His Character is now raised much above the reach of ignorance, envy
or malice… THE DEFENDER OF THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS,
by Strength of his own Genius, has, on the noblest Foundation, that
of promoting the Good of Mankind, erected to himself a Monument,
which will transmit his Memory with Honour, to latest Posterity.57
Again, the protagonist of the Zenger trial was viewed as Andrew Hamilton. In fact, the
jury was not mentioned at all. It is also noteworthy that the antagonist was not defined.
Hamilton may be “THE DEFENDER OF THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS,” but from
whom? It went unnamed… for now.
Finally, even the most vocal critics of the Zenger ignored the jury and zeroed in
on Andrew Hamilton and the finer points of libel law. Two lawyers from Barbados
writing under the pseudonyms, Indus-Britannicus and Anglo-Americanus, provided an
extended assessment of Hamilton’s arguments with interwoven personal attacks. For
example, Anglo-Americanus lamented that libel laws are “so well canvassed, and are
generally so well understood” that Hamilton must have “never thought of making any
other use of them than to satisfy his own curiosity, and that of his friends.”58
Indus-Britannicus directed his response to Hamilton: “Sir; It must be mortifying, no
doubt, to a person who has received peculiar marks of public approbation, to be told, that
the very act which produces it was so far from being commendable, that it really deserved

56

The Pennsylvania Gazette (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), May 17, 1738.
The Pennsylvania Gazette (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), May 17, 1738.
58
Remarks on the trial of John Peter Zenger, Printer of the New-York Weekly Journal Who was lately Try’d
and Acquitted for Printing and Publishing Two Libels Against the Government of that Province, (London:
printed for J. Roberts, 1738), iii.
57

22

a good censure.”59 He also described Hamilton as a “pernicious creature” with “much
assurance, little knowledge, and no morals.”60
Anglo-Americanus mentioned the jury when he attributed the verdict to
Hamilton’s “dexterity in captivating them.”61 In doing so, the jury was explained as
being acted upon, not in action. Indus-Britannicus echoes this sentiment: Hamilton “uses
his arts, and plays his game with a dozen of honest men, of as good natural
understandings, perhaps, though not of equal experience and cunning with himself.”62
The jury was tricked and were the victims of Hamilton’s deceits. The verdict may have
been an act of nullification, but contemporaries did not describe it as a political act of the
jury. It was a consequence of the skills and schemes of the lawyer. This vision of Zenger
and nullification did not last.
Zenger was resurrected thirty-six years later, when another “libelous” printer,
Alexander McDougall reshaped its narrative. In 1770, Alexander McDougall
anonymously authored a broadside entitled “Address to the Betrayed Inhabitants of New
York'' that aired grievances about troops stationed in the area. It was deemed seditious.
McDougall was indicted by a grand jury and arrested. So began a brilliant public
relations campaign that redefined Zenger for a new generation.
Though wealthy enough to afford bail, McDougall strategically remained in
prison for two and half months to build support. All the while, the New York press
championed McDougall, generating attention to his cause. John Parker, McDougall’s
guilt-ridden informant and publisher, printed regular references to Zenger in their
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advocacy for McDougall. The New York Journal followed suit.63 Parallels were drawn
from Zenger to contemporary political causes that sparked renewed interest in the old
case. James Alexander’s account of the trial was reprinted in its entirety in New York for
the first time since 1736.64 Zenger reentered the zeitgeist, but it did more than prime the
potential jury pool to nullify. The public, on the eve of revolution, engaged in a process
of meaning-making that reimagined Zenger, juries and nullification. By the 1770s,
Zenger was understood by contemporaries in a larger context of unpopular British laws.65
In 1770, on a mid-April evening in New York, while McDougall sat in prison,
three-hundred men sat down for a celebratory dinner. With the several barrels of beer
available, they made forty-five separate toasts. Number seventeen was to Alexander
McDougall “who has stood forth in its (the cause of liberty) defense.” Number
thirty-seven was to “The memory of Andrew Hamilton, Esq; who undauntedly advocated
the cause of John Peter Zinger,” but number thirty-eight was to “Zenger’s Jury, who
regardless of the Directions of the Court, refuted to bring in a Special Verdict, and
acquitted the prisoner.”66 By 1770, Zenger’s jury was becoming as toast-worthy as
Andrew Hamilton. It was no coincidence that this dinner was held on the anniversary of
the repeal of the Stamp Act, and its allowance for the use of jury-less admiralty courts.
Zenger’s and McDougall’s legal problems were understood in an environment worried
about government overreach.
A month before the dinner, The Pennsylvania Gazette described the recently
republished Zenger case as “a noble instance of the firmness and intercity of a Jury.”
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Hamilton is still described as “just” and “brave,” but the real praise was saved for the
jury:
In this case every artifice of arbitrary power was used; and the
Judges plainly shewed, that they sat there only during the
governor’s pleasure: Yet notwithstanding all the partial influence
of power, and base direction of the bench, the jury, to their
immortal honor, acquitted the prisoner, by bringing in their verdict,
NOT GUILTY. 67
The 1770s perspective emphasized the active role of the jury. How acts of nullification
were understood had changed. In 1738, the exact same paper that had announced Andrew
Hamilton’s “immortal honour” now awarded it to the jury.68 McDougall’s charges were
dropped without a trial in 1771, but the new formulation of Zenger continued.69
The narrative of a court case is centered on conflict. Zenger began as a story of
Andrew Hamilton versus an unnamed specter for a free press. It became the legend of a
jury standing up to the exercise of “arbitrary power” by the imperial government.
Nullification was now explained as an overt political confrontation. Bernard Bailyn has
argued that a “radical idealization and conceptualization of the previous century and a
half of American experience” occurred in the decade prior to Independence. 70 In 1770,
Zenger was not remembered; it was created. The context of 1770 generated a trial with a
hyper-political jury defying arbitrary government action, far removed from Andrew
Hamilton’s 1730s battle for a free press. What is especially fascinating is that in both
instances, the explanation of the case was based on the same source material, James
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Alexander's Brief Narrative of the Case and Trial of John Peter Zenger, Printer of the
New York Weekly Journal. Yet, how Zenger was understood was entirely different.
The constitutional debates brought another resurgence of Zenger or as
Gouverneur Morris called the case: the “morning star of that liberty which subsequently
revolutionized America!” 71 Juries were a central point of contention in the debates. While
Alexander Hamilton noted the only difference among the delegates was whether juries
were a “valuable safeguard to liberty” or the “very palladium of free government,”
Anti-Federalists were very critical of the lack of civil jury protections.72 To hammer the
importance of jury protections, the tone of Zenger analysis in 1789 was bombastic. For
example, The Independent Gazetteer described the “Tyranny” of the Governor, Supreme
Court, and Council “bent on the ruin of that honest German, Zenger” until “The honest,
patriotic Jury withdrew a short time, and from an insuperable love of liberty, - the press and their country, acquitted Zenger.”73 Nullification was a jury-centered action in a
political clash with government tyranny. The jury did not just fight the executive
governor, the judiciary, and the legislative Council. It won. The jury was understood as a
political institution on par with the other branches. Or as one of the Anti-Federalists
explained: “It was the jury only, that saved Zenger,... it can only be a jury that will save
any future printer from the fangs of power.”74 The jury was revered as an institution with
the highest amount of public trust.
Zenger was reimagined with a new champion, the jury, but why? Stanley N. Katz
argued that Zenger was “the origins and sources of change” which “allow[ed] us to see in
71
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dramatic detail… the transformation of both politics and law.”75 In a similar vein, Alison
Olson noted that dozens of print satires were published between the Zenger and the
Stamp Act. She suggested that the trial “made possible the dynamic growth of political
expression in the colonies by making it relatively safe for American writers to publish
political humor.”76 These scholars have focused on how Zenger influenced political
culture. However, the reverse is also true: Zenger interpretations were influenced by
contemporary political culture.
Juries do not provide legal reasoning for their decisions. The entirety of their
reasons, logic, and opinions is summarized in their general verdict of guilty or not guilty.
It cannot be followed or reproduced by future juries because there is no record to review.
As a result, verdicts do not generate authority for deciding subsequent cases. Juries
cannot create precedents the way judicial opinions can. Judicial opinions are often written
with explanations and reasonings to support the ruling. There is a record to follow.
Zenger was decided by a jury verdict. A verdict that did not change, and could not change
the law. The non-binding nature of jury verdicts caused Leonard W. Levy to ask, “Does
Zenger even matter?”77 However, the case’s true legacy was not in establishing legal
precedent, but in the way it became mythologized into a symbol of a revolutionary jury in
the decades that followed. It is not a question of “Does Zenger matter,” but when? And
for what reasons? Is Zenger about a German publisher standing up for the freedom of the
press; the elder attorney’s deft assault on libel law; or the grit and tenacity of a jury
unwilling to bend to colonial tyranny? It depends on when you ask. I argue that the
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alterations in the retellings of Zenger, that brought the jury’s action to the forefront of the
story, revealed a new attitude towards jury nullification.
Each retelling of Zenger became a new site of meaning-making for nullification.
Each reimagining was also an act of revisionism that retroactively applied more political
meaning to Zenger than was originally understood. In 1789, nullification was a
jury-centered, hyper-political action with a long, albeit slightly manufactured, history.
Jury independence was described in institutional terms, placed on equal footing with
other branches of government. It was given an explicit political purpose: defense against
arbitrary government action. Nullification was glorified, directly because of its political
purposes, in a singular and previously unseen way.

2.2 BEYOND ZENGER: EARLY EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY DESCRIPTIONS OF
NULLIFICATION
The previous section examined a single case over an extended period of time.
This section seeks to approach the cultural understanding of nullification more
systematically by examining multiple sources in the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth
centuries to establish patterns of thought. Early colonials engaged in a process of
meaning-making that identified causes to explain how nullification occurred and
provided reasons to explain why it occurred. These causes and reasonings are the
elements that constitute the cultural understanding of nullification.
The Zenger analysis suggested that early colonial conceptions of nullification did
not acknowledge jury agency. If juries were not considered the primary actors in
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nullification, who were? Colonial administrators blamed inept prosecutors, charismatic
defendants, and unlikeable officials. Occasionally, the role the jury played in nullification
was discussed. Jury-focused descriptions of nullification recognized the jury’s social
connections, emotional state, and moral character. Contemporary explanations did not
discuss potential political motivations or purposes of the jury.
For example, Navigation Acts cases frequently ended in jury nullification. One
Maryland case is uniquely useful. In 1696, the jury refused to convict John Blackmore on
clear violations of the Acts. After the verdict, the Court of Appeals asked for an
explanation from local lawyers.78 The court wanted to understand how and why
nullification occurred and explicitly asked for answers. The responses are a record of a
1696 brainstorm on nullification.
Multiple responses, including one from the Attorney General, interpreted
Blackmore’s verdict as a result of prosecutorial error. The prosecution failed to properly
challenge the defense. This was a procedural issue that a better attorney could have
avoided. These responses concluded that the jury did not refuse to enforce the Navigation
Acts; it was just a stickler to procedural points.79 This interpretation did not just
rationalize the jury's behavior, it erased the nullification. Edward Randolph, the colonial
official tasked with customs enforcements, also weighed in on the Blackmore case. He
recognized the prosecutorial error, but also saw misconduct. He identified the
prosecutor’s pro-smuggling sympathies as the source of the problem.80 However, the
possibilities of jurors with pro-smuggling sympathies was never mentioned. In fact, only
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one consulted lawyers used the jury to explain the jury verdict. Charles Carroll noted that
juries “oftentimes Judge according to the Affection or disaffection they have for the
person plaintiffe or Defendant.”81 Carroll’s jury-centered explanation understood
nullification as an emotional decision connected to social relationships: a recurring theme
in early colonial explanations of nullification.
The Blackmore trial was one of many Navigation Act trials that ended in
nullification, to the dismay of Edward Randolph. After a nullification verdict in
Massachusetts, Randolph blamed a “Faction” that “amuse[d] and possess[ed] the
people.”82 The people were misled. The jury was still understood as the passive proxies
of other parties. This description echoed the early criticism of Zenger’s attorney who
used “his arts, and play[ed] his game with a dozen of honest men.”83 The term “faction”
was political. The organization and unity of purpose was clear. However, the “faction”
was separated from the “people,” the jurors.
Lionel Copley, the first Royal Governor of Maryland, had a much simpler
explanation for the nullified verdicts. Nullifications occurred because Randolph was
hated; “Indeed should he bring a cause never soe plausible before any jury though of the
best principles and inclinations, his insolent and too well know behaviour [would] soe
dimm and obscure their eyes that they could not make a right inspection”84 Copley did
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not mention the Navigation Acts at all, only that “the whole country was weary of him
(Randolph).”85 This was personal, not political.
Beyond the Navigation Act, explanations of other nullifications marginalized
juries or defined the acts in socio-moral terms. In 1707, Presbyterian minister Francis
Makemie, in open defiance of New York law, preached without a license and was
arrested. In court, Makemie admitted to delivering a sermon without a license, yet the
jury still acquitted.86 However, it is Makemie, not the jury, who gained a reputation as a
staunch defender of religious liberty and was celebrated in Boston after his release.87 The
jury and its actions were not yet interpreted as the true protagonists of the conflict.
Reminiscent of Randolph’s troubles with the Navigation Act in New England,
Georgia juries refused to convict defendants for violating an unpopular ban on the
importation and distribution of rum. In 1735, after an initial “not guilty” verdict in a case
against a “notorious Retailer of Rum,” Thomas Caustan, the chief judge, directed the jury
to deliberate further because the evidence was clear.88 However, he accepted the jury’s
second “not guilty” verdict.89 William Stephens, the Trustees' official observer of colonial
affairs and future President of the entire colony, described the verdict as "barefaced" and
"scandalous" in his journals.90 This critique, while unabashedly negative, is not overtly
political. Stephens’ language indicated he viewed this act of nullification as a moral
failing. In Savannah, another suspected rum smuggler “had so many friends amongst the
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freeholders that they publicly declared in town that no jury would convict him.”91 Like
the Navigation Acts, nullification was understood in terms of the social power of the
defendants and not the political principles of the jurors.92
In the extreme, nullification was understood as a moral failing of the jury. Edward
Randolph described his jurors as “base, perjured and forestrong rogues.”93 He also
complained that the juries, who consisted of the same merchants and masters of ships
targeted by the Navigation Acts. The jurors were motivated by self-interest. 94 Another
jilted party came to similar conclusions. Reverend James Maury, the Anglican defendant
in the Parson’s Cause, blamed his one-penny jury award on his jury’s ignorance and
“vulgar” character.95 In his account of the trial, he wrote, “Nay, though I objected against
them yet, as Patrick Henry (one of the Defendant's lawyers) insisted they were honest
men.”96 By framing the issue in terms of honesty/dishonesty, he created a moral question.
The jurors were not acknowledged as radical or impaired by anti-British politics; they
were dishonest.
Early colonials observed acts of nullification and engaged in constructing
meaning. Oftentimes, they looked for answers outside of the jury. However, when the
jury was acknowledged, they were understood to have been duped or misled. Other
explanations supposed juries prioritized their social connections and emotions over the
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law, or were simply ignorant, lying, rogues. There was one exception, where the jury is
fully recognized as acting in a political manner; cases where the white colonial
community’s race politics conflicted with the law and larger governmental interests.
In 1643, a Maryland jury refused to convict John Elkin, who confessed to
murdering a local Indian chief. The jury did not believe killing a “pagan” should qualify
as murder under local law.97 The Governor and the presiding judge Leonard Calvert
disagreed, stating that English law was the prevailing law and that murder of a “pagan”
was a crime. Calvert advised the jury to revise their verdict. The colonial government had
a vested interest in normalizing relations with local Indian groups. The jurors returned,
finding Elkin innocent on grounds of self-defense. Elkins’ confession and two witnesses
made it clear it was not self-defense. Calvert refused the verdict, ordered a new trial with
a new jury, and fined George Pye, the most prominent member of the original jury.98 Pye
responded that “if an Englishman had beene killed by the Indians there would not have
beene so much words made of it.”99 This comment revealed an awareness of wider
political dynamics than was seen in other contemporary cases.
Almost a century later, in 1734, a Georgia colonist, Joseph Watson “had gloried in
killing an Indian by drinking him to death.”100 Several Creek Indians, alleged murder and
demanded Watson be given to them. However, Thomas Causton, was unwilling to
comply because an Englishman executed after a tribal murder trial would have been
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unacceptable to most colonists.101 While he did seek to punish Watson under English law,
the colonial jury only found Watson guilty of unguarded expressions. Further, the jury
asked for leniency because the jury believed Watson to be a lunatic.102 It is clear from the
historical record that Georgia officials Thomas Causton, James Oglethorpe, and John
Perceval considered Watson a murderer and a threat to peaceful trade relations. Yet, the
jury would not convict. John Perceval explained the verdict: “Men are deemed lunatics
sometimes in their senses, and that it was protection to his person that he was confined,
[because] the Indians [were] seeking his death.”103 Both the choice to prosecute in
colonial courts and the jury’s failure to bring a murder conviction were
contemporaneously understood in the context of the larger disparate political interest of
the Creek Indians, imperial English, and Anglo-settler interests.
Many race-motivated, would-be nullification cases never made it to court. As a
result, we cannot fully measure the conflict between the state and local politics because
of extrajudicial resolutions. The consequences of race politics were more likely to occur
prior to a jury being empaneled, like in the case of Frederick Stump. In 1758, Stump
killed ten American Indians in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. He was captured,
placed in a jail, and then freed by an armed mob. No other judicial or state action
occurred.104
Moments when the mechanisms of state power did not align with local practices,
nullification and extrajudicial action often followed. In the Stump Affair, the murders
occurred during a period of unsanctioned colonial encroachment into western
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Pennsylvania, in violations of treaties with the Six Nations.105 Likewise, the Elkin and
Watson cases were incidents where state security and trade interests were in conflict with
local colonial beliefs. This connection is not isolated to the colonial period. Jury
nullification, as a tool for local race-politics, was particularly well-documented in many
post-Reconstruction criminal cases as well. All-white juries refusing to convict racially
motivated crimes or refusing to enforce federal civil rights legislation were a hallmark of
the Jim Crow south.106 Or, as one critic of nullification has argued, the “invitation to
jurors to vote their consciences is inevitably an invitation to greater parochialism.”107

2.3 BEYOND ZENGER: LATER EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY DESCRIPTIONS OF
NULLIFICATION
In the second half of the eighteenth-century, the manner in which jury
nullification was discussed changed. Nullification descriptions became jury-centered and
identified jurors as active participants. Nullification explanations began to recognize all
jury behavior as acts of political resistance, not just in cases of race-politics. The jury’s
intent to oppose authority of government, both British and American, was directly
acknowledged. Finally, some juries were conceptualized as more than a representational
slice of a community, but as civic representatives answerable to their community. The
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revolutionary jury was considered a political, independent, institutional force that
functioned as the “active sovereignty of the people.”108
An early example of this change was the criminal case of John Henry Rice. In
1758, Rice, a known thief and deserter from Colonel Gage's regiment was put on trial in
New Jersey for stealing a horse.109 When caught, he was riding the horse he was accused
of stealing. Then, he confessed to the crime on two separate occasions. Yet, “to the
surprise of the whole court,” the jury acquitted Rice.110 The New American Magazine
described the verdict: “assuming to themselves (contrary to their oath) the power of
extending mercy to the criminal, which was grantable only by the king himself, or his
vice-gerant, the governor of the province.”111 The newspaper explained the action as an
explicit exercise of political power. Even more than an exercise of power, it was defined
as an antagonistic usurpation of power reserved to the king and executive colonial
authorities. Finally, the phrase “assuming for themselves” featured the jurors as the main
actors. This was a new political framework.
The critics of Rice placed nullification within a highly political context, distinct
from early understandings. This politicized shift in perception was even clearer in the
custom evasion cases of the later eighteenth-century. Since its enactment, jury
nullification targeted the Navigation Acts. Colonial juries protected many flagrant
smugglers and tax evaders from royal custom agents with a “not guilty” verdict.
Revolutionary juries, however, went even further. They exercised their ability to
determine the law to directly antagonize government officials. Civil cases were used to
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harass British custom agents and successfully expelled agents in Charleston and
Albany.112 In 1772, a Rhode Island crowd burned a revenue ship, the Gaspee. Afterwards,
it was only the shipowner, not the arsonists, who faced legal repercussions. He was sued
and lost for unlawful conversion from imperially authorized revenue seizures.113 Juries
were determining law aggressively to achieve political objectives.
As a result, the British instituted a series of policies to avoid colonial juries. They
prosecuted cases in the jury-less admiralty courts and treason trials were prepared to be
conducted in England. In 1773, British administrators demanded control of the salaries of
Massachusetts judges from the colonial legislature. Administrators wanted greater
authority over the court system and planned to acquire it through the purse strings. Critics
were adamant that the court justices should remain independent. Four justices agreed, but
the Chief Justice, Peter Oliver accepted the imperial payments. Juries resisted by refusing
to take oaths of office or serve on his cases. This was not nullification, but it was a
jury-created assertion of authority over the courts and the law. It was a purposeful and
uniform action. Stephan Landsman argued that, “These jurors became spokesmen,
articulating colonial resolve with respect to judicial independence”114
These British policies shaped the independence movement. The Stamp Act
Congress requested Britain to show deference to colonial juries and the First and Second
Colonial Congresses denounced interference with colonial juries.115 In the Declaration of

112

Donald M. Middlebrooks, "Reviving Thomas Jefferson's Jury: Sparf and Hansen v. United States
Reconsidered," The American Journal of Legal History 46, no. 4 (2004): 389.
113
Reid, In a Defiant Stance : The Conditions of Law in Massachusetts Bay, the Irish Comparison; and the
Coming of the American Revolution, 86.
114
Landsman, “The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated History,” 595; Francis G. Walett,
“The Massachusetts Council, 1766-1774: The Transformation of a Conservative Institution,” The William
and Mary Quarterly 6, no. 4 (1949): 621.
115
Stephan Landsman, and James F. Holderman, "The Evolution of the Jury Trial in America," Litigation
37, no. 1 (2010): 34.

37

Independence, Thomas Jefferson listed “depriving us, in many cases, of the benefits of
Trial by Jury” as a major grievance.116 The glorification of jury resistance coupled with
the memory of British retaliatory jury restrictions influenced the framers of the
Constitution.
The framers did not just endorse trial-by-jury, but recognized the political
importance of the right to nullify. Federalists, Anti-Federalists, Thomas Jefferson, John
Adams, Alexander Hamilton, Gouverneur Morris all advocated for the right for juries to
decide questions of law on at least some occasions.. Jefferson wrote, “the juries [are] our
judges of all fact, and of the law when they chose it.”117 Though, he added a caveat that
nullification should be reserved for cases of judicial partiality. Jefferson saw the role of
the jury as “curbing a distrusted judiciary.”118 As a result, nullification was viewed, not in
legal terms, but as a political check to judicial overreach.
In 1771, John Adams argued, “It is not only [the juror’s] right, but his duty . . . to
find the verdict according to his own best understanding, judgment, and conscience,
though in direct opposition to the direction of the court.”119 Adams made this argument as
a defense attorney hoping for an acquittal. Therefore, this was not necessarily the
reflection of a Founder’s beliefs, but an argument by a lawyer focused on the interests of
his client. Adams, as an astute lawyer, was considering his audience when he made this
argument. He was betting that the average juror understood nullification to be an act of
civic duty. This makes the quote even more valuable for our purposes of defining the
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cultural understanding of nullification. Adams was presented with a random selection of
twelve jurors. He believed they would accept nullification as a “duty” in “direct
opposition” to the courts. This framing was political.
Understanding jury nullification in more political terms had consequences. It
created greater public expectations on juries. Acts of nullification were viewed as
political and nullifying juries were seen as institutional safeguards. However, the
revolutionary public began demanding juries also be answerable to the public. Nullifying
juries were not just understood as political, but as political bodies. This was evident by
the violent response to the Philadelphia treason trials where acts of nullification led to
widespread public debate, jury intimidation, and ultimately a riot.
After nine months of occupation, British troops evacuated Philadelphia in the
summer of 1778. The departure prompted twenty-three charges of high treason for
actions during the occupation. The defendants were not Tory heavyweights, but artisans,
mostly blacksmiths, millers and carpenters who had engaged in economic relations with
the British.120 Of the twenty-three defendants, nineteen were acquitted. Even in the cases
of conviction, the jurors asked the sentencing judge to extend clemency.121 In the
serendipitous nature of history, one of those acquitted defendants was William Hamilton,
the grandson of Andrew Hamilton, the advocate of Peter Zenger and jury nullification.
The evidentiary records are extremely sparse, but it is likely that these lop-sided
results were acts of nullification.122 The judges presiding over the trials attributed the
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serial acquittals, not to any innocence, but the “extreme lenity and tenderness of the
Juries.”123 Finally, the critics of the acquittals blamed the jurors for the verdicts. Larson,
one of the leading scholars on the trials, credited the verdicts to a smart strategy of
peremptory challenges by the defense attorney, a distaste for capital punishment among
the jurors, the consequence of serial jury service, and the jurors’ strong belief in their
own independence from external influences.124
There was a great deal of public interest in the cases. As the trials progressed and
the acquittals accumulated, the public became increasingly agitated.125 The controversy
was hyped in an intense debate in local newspapers. On April 29, 1779, after nineteen
acquittals, an article in the The Pennsylvania Packet demanded that the names of jurors
be published so that the defendants and jurors could be treated with the “contempt they so
justly deserve.”126 The anonymous writer defended this position by highlighting the civic
role of jury duty; “A juryman, as such, is a public character; and as it is the privilege of
the people to criticize public measures and characters, they must submit to the same
tribunal with others, and have their conduct upon such interesting and important
occasions open to the public eye.”127 Nullification was still jury-centered and political.
However, the categorization of the jury as an institution of power, answerable to the
people was new.
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The April 29th letter triggered a series of responses defending the jurors. 128 But
those who disapproved of the spree of acquittals asserted their right to criticize. Under the
pseudonym “Cato,” one writer argued that because juries were “acting on public
occasions,” they must “stand or fall in the public opinion.”129 Another asserted the “Right
of free discussion and examination, at all times exercised by the public over juryman.”130
Finally, a critic reprinted the incriminating letter that prompted one defendant’s
indictment. His stated purpose was to allow the public to “judge for themselves.”131 He
concluded; “If the opinion of the Jury is their opinion, all is well. If they are dissatisfied
with the verdict, they have a right to say so.”132
The commentators’ anger was not about nullification. They were angered that the
acts of nullification did not reflect the will of the people. The majority of attacks about
the treason trials maintained the public’s right to criticize and the jury's right to nullify.
The sobriquet “X” cautioned juries that “every man will judge how far they acquit
themselves as free, independent, and well informed judges between the law, the
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government, and the people (my emphasis).”133 Here, an act of nullification was not just
between the jury and the law or a power struggle between the jury and the judge, it was
part of a relationship between the jury and the people. The jury was beholden to the
public.
In July 1779, two months after the newspaper debates, Samuel Rowland Fisher
was charged with treason. The jury deliberated throughout the night, during which time,
militia members arrived to intimidate the jury. The jury returned with an acquittal, but
was sent back to deliberate further. They returned a second verdict of acquittal and were
sent back a second time. After a third deliberation, the jury returned with a guilty
verdict.134 As a result, Fisher would spend two years and two days in jail, but would
manage to avoid the noose.135
Intimidation turned into actual violence by October of 1779. Again, local militia
members were the instigators, encouraged by a handbill calling for the physical removal
of residents overly sympathetic to the Tory-cause.136 Many of the named men gathered at
the house of James Wilson, who had worked as defense counsel for several of the
accused traitors. Armed men marched to the house and a gun fight transpired. It left six or
seven dead and over a dozen wounded. The militiamen cited “the exceeding lenity which
has been shown to persons notoriously disaffected to the Independence of the United
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States” as one reason for the behavior.”137 The extra-legal justice of nullification led to an
extra-legal correction of mob rule.
Deteriorating economic conditions were a major factor in the Philadelphia treason
trials. The jurors were seventeen times wealthier than the average Philadelphian.138 The
defendants were largely economically successful artisans and alleged criminal activities
were often related to that economic success. For example, David Franks, whose acquittal
sparked the newspaper editorial wars, had been indicted for sending local pricing
information to his brother, who worked with the British navy. The worsening economic
environment inflamed outage over opportunist behavior. During the months of trials and
acquittals, war-time inflation and scarcity drastically increased in the city. These
economic strains were felt first and most intensely by the working poor, a class excluded
from jury service, but the majority of Philadelphia's militiamen.139 Economics may
explain why Philadelphians reacted negatively to the nullifications, but the way they
reacted indicated a desire for a representational relationship with juries. They treated
juries as a political institution that was expected to act on behalf of the people. This was a
revolutionary jury.

2.4 CONCLUSION

Zenger would be reimagined once again in the nineteenth-century. By the 1830s,
Andrew Hamilton had returned to the forefront of the trial’s retellings. According to The

137

Larson, “The Revolutionary American Jury,” 1506.
Larson, “The Revolutionary American Jury,” 1473.
139
Benjamin H. Irvin, "The Streets of Philadelphia: Crowds, Congress, and the Political Culture of
Revolution, 1774-1783," The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 129, no. 1 (2005):11.
138

43

Charleston Daily Courier, Zenger published “strictures” and “was shortly afterwards
imprisoned, under a warrant from the Governor and Council, for 35 weeks. Andrew
Hamilton, an eminent lawyer of Philadelphia, defended him, and he was acquitted.”140 In
this account, it was not even clear if there was a jury. While the Carlisle Weekly Herald‘s
re-telling included a jury, it was once again the passive body under Hamilton’s influence:
Andrew Hamilton “came to New York to plead Zenger’s cause, and made so able a plea,
that the jury brought in the prisoner not guilty.”141 Once again, the understanding of
Zenger had shifted and the era of revolution was over.
By the end of the 1840s, the case bordered on complete irrelevancy. Between
1847 and 1850, a series of newspaper articles were published about women printers.142
Each stated that The New York Journal passed to Mrs. Zenger after the death of Mr.
Zenger, followed by: “She was a modest and moderate woman, the exact reverse of her
husband, who managed to have as many libel suits on hand as a certain literary character
of our time. The consequence was, Zenger got into full intimacy with the prisons, for
giving public utterance to his liberal views.”143 There was no Andrew Hamilton, patriotic
jury, or government tyranny in the Zenger of 1848. And by an 1850 publication in The
Wilkes-Barre Advocate, even the eponymous printer had become “Renger.”144 As we shall
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see in the following chapters, like the memory of Zenger, the political framing of
nullification would recede over the course of the nineteenth-century.
This chapter provided the historical context for the future chapters on Antebellum
nullification. The socio-moral framework of the nineteenth-century can be seen as a
return to earlier conventions, but its jury-centric focus was a remnant of the Revolution.
This chapter also suggested a relationship between the politicized jury and legal certainty.
In the nineteenth century, the judicial critique of nullification was that it led to
uncertainty in the law. This criticism was not seen in the eighteenth-century. Morton
Horwitz explained the distinction: “Since the problem of maintaining legal certainty
before the Revolution was largely identified with preventing political arbitrariness, juries
were rarely charged with contributing to the unpredictability or uncertainty of the legal
system.”145 I would take this position further. Juries were not just “rarely charged with
contributing to the unpredictability,” their purpose was understood to be preventing
arbitrariness and uncertainty. Certainty was only later weaponized against the jury, once
jury nullification was no longer considered in political terms. The following chapters
connect the renewed socio-moral understanding of nullification with the
nineteenth-century critique on certainty.
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CHAPTER 3. THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY JURY

Beginning in the 1820s and continuing through the 1850s, the cultural
understanding of jury nullification returned to a socio-moral framework. The public and
state legislatures explained nullification as a result of social connection, powerful jury
emotions, or amoral chicanery. The first half of this chapter explores the three themes,
connection, emotion, chicanery, and the return of the socio-moral understanding of jury
nullification. The second half of the chapter examines how this shift in cultural
understanding influenced court-decisions and the judiciary’s self-image. The purpose of
this chapter is to reverse the court-focused narrative that begins with the changes in the
judiciary and then measures its impact elsewhere. I begin with changes outside the
judiciary and then measure the impact on the court itself. This difference in perspective
can provide insight on how law is made and why laws change.

3.1 NULLIFICATION AS A SOCIAL CONNECTION

In the nineteenth-century, nullification explanations were increasingly focused on
the defendant's social connections. Throughout the country, acts of nullification were
viewed as a consequence of societal, familial, and community connections. This section
examines two connections associated with jury nullification: Freemason membership in
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New England and the Mid-Atlantic states and elite social status in Kentucky. At the heart
of the social connection explanation was a deep anxiety about the threat of wealth and
privilege on democratic values. The public believed nullification occurred because social
connections held more sway with juries than the rule of law. This stood in stark contrast
to the popular representation associated with the revolutionary jury.
One short-lived example of the social connection explanation began with a
murder in upstate New York and ended in national paranoia of a vast Freemason
conspiracy undermining the administration of justice. While anti-Masonic sentiments had
been brewing in America in the 1820s, an event in Batavia, New York set it aflame. In
1826, William Morgan planned to publish an exposé on Freemasonry. Just before the
publication date, he was abducted by a group of Masons and never seen again. Most
concluded he was murdered. At least eighteen separate trials convened, but all were
acquitted of murder. Only four were convicted of the lesser charges of kidnapping and
false imprisonment. The verdicts set off a “wave of anti-Masonic hysteria” in New
England and the Mid-Atlantic states.146
The acts of nullification were understood as a consequence of unchecked
Freemasonry in the justice system. Freemasons were the judges, the sheriffs, and the
jurors. Newspapers across the country saw conspiratorial intrigue in the results.147 The
Lancaster Examiner observed, “more than one freemason has been heard to say that the
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judges were masons, the sheriffs were masons, and the jurymen would be masons.”148
The Gettysburg Compiler noted, “on Grand Juries a majority of Freemasons not only
acquitted their brethren presented for this crime, but strangely certified in one instance
that no proof was offered.”149 The social connection between the defendants and the
jurors was understood to subvert justice. Or as the Wilmington Expositor asked, “Can any
unprejudiced man seriously think that members of a fraternity should be ced[sic] upon
the inquiring and accusing jury, which had in charge an accusation that vitally affected
that fraternity?”150
The Masonic trials were more than a Dan-Brown-worthy isolated event. It had a
disproportionately wide impact on how juries and nullification were conceived. First, the
event prompted a variety of legislation to restrict jury access. New York ended the
practice of sheriffs rounding up jurors out of concerns of jury tampering.151 Before this
bill, New York sheriffs assembled juries with easy opportunities for jury tampering. Bills
prohibiting jurors from taking Masonic oaths and “extrajudicial oaths,” a euphemism for
the Masonic oath, were proposed in Pennsylvania and Connecticut. Similar bills passed in
Rhode Island (1833), Vermont (1833), and Massachusetts (1834). Legislatures in New
York and Pennsylvania even proposed banning Masons from jury duty altogether.152 None
of the laws directly regulated nullification, but all of them were a consequence of
nullification and concerns over powerful social privilege.
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While the Anti-Masonic movement was short-lived, it functioned as a model for a
process that continued in the increasingly pluralistic nineteenth-century. Elizabeth
Bussiere cited two examples that paralleled the Masonic trials: the Society of Free
Inquirers blasphemy trials and the trials of anti-Catholic mob violence in Charleston,
Massachusetts. After Abner Kneeland was acquitted for blasphemy, the Boston Evening
Transcript and Mercantile Journal revealed that the sole juror objecting to conviction
was a member of Kneeland's Society of Free Inquirers.153 This revelation was disputed,
but it revealed an underlying assumption about nullification. When it occurred, the public
looked at social links for explanation.
Bussiere’s other example was the criminal trials following the 1834 Ursuline
convent riots in Charlestown. Despite the clear evidence, the all-Protestant jurors
acquitted all but one defendant. During the trials, James T. Austin, the state’s Attorney
General, was “obsessed by the possibility that Protestant jurors would act on their
sectarian prejudices and simply refuse to convict the accused rioters regardless of the
evidence.”154 Freemasons would not convict Freemasons. Free-thinkers would not convict
Free-thinkers. Protestants would not convict Protestants. Or so the social-connection
explanation concluded.
The revolutionary jury understood judges and government authorities as threats
to the administration of justice. However, the social connection explanation implied a
new danger, the jury. The public’s distrust of the jury was increasing and acts of
nullification were beginning to reinforce the suspicion. It was not a coincidence that the
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first major, post-Revolution judicial argument against nullification occurred in 1835,
Massachusetts. After a decade of Masonic conspiracies throughout New England, a wave
of spectacle nullifications in Massachusetts, and local newspapers promoting the
social-connection explanations, courts began rejecting the right to nullify. In Battiste,
Justice Joseph Story held that it was the “duty of the jury to follow the law.”155 R. Kent
Newmyer has posited that it was distrust of legislators and laymen alike that molded his
“his vision of a "judge-centric" legal culture.”156 The socio-moral framework shaped that
distrust.
Social connections, less formal than the Freemasons, were also used to explain the
frequentacts of nullification in Kentucky criminal cases. In the 1840s and 1850s, state
legislators were beginning to acknowledge systemic problems in the state's approach to
criminal justice. Every questionable acquittal led to a public looking for an explanation.
Why did the obviously guilty defendant walk free? Prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges,
the law, and often, the jury were criticized. Ultimately, in 1849 a constitutional
convention was held to consider criminal justice reform.
Nullification was understood as a result of wealth and elite social privilege
inducing local bias and instigating jury packing. As one convention delegate, Richard
Mayes, lamented: “The power of money… has entered the very temple erected and
dedicated to justice, and has contaminated and poisoned that stream which should ever be
kept pure.”157 Mayes' comments show his concerns over the influence of wealth. He also
155
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relied on religious imagery. Justice occupied a temple. He used a purity metaphor with
language like poisoned, contaminated and pure. The issue was understood within a
framework of virtue and morality. Nullification was depoliticized.
The “power of money” was evident in the trial of Matt Ward. On November 2,
1853, Ward, the son of the wealthiest man in Kentucky shot and killed the Louisville
High School principal. Fit for a true crime podcast, the sensational details of the case
brought immediate national attention to the subsequent trial. After Ward’s not-guilty
verdict, the coverage intensified.158
The Pittsburgh Gazette presumed Ward would have been convicted in places
“where justice [was] more regarded than money”159 Along with the impact of wealth, the
paper blamed the “susceptibility of Kentucky jurymen to improper influence.”160 New
York’s The Churchman described the verdict even more plainly: “Then to the high
classes, the sense of immunity to themselves robs the spectacle of hanging, or the threat
of its laws.”161 Nullification was understood as the consequence of the social influence of
elites and the jury was blamed. The Churchman hoped for the “remnant of their miserable
lives,” the jury faced the “unmistakable expression of the scorn and loathing which this
atrocious decision so richly deserves.”162
The concept that social connection could prevent conviction was widespread.
When a former Congressman shot and killed his brother-in-law in open court, The
Louisville Daily Courier anticipated his acquittal through jury nullification with the

158

Robert M. Ireland, “Acquitted Yet Scorned: The Ward Trial and the Traditions of Antebellum Kentucky
Criminal Justice,” The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 84, no. 2 (1986): 107–45.
159
“The Murderer Ward,” The Pittsburgh Gazette (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania), May 2, 1854.
160
“The Murderer Ward,” The Pittsburgh Gazette (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania), May 2, 1854.
161
The Churchman (New York, New York), May 6, 1854.
162
The Churchman (New York, New York), May 6, 1854.

51

comment: the defendant was “singularly fortunate by the selection of the jury.”163 While
the not-guilty verdict was foreseen, it was not endorsed. After the congressman’s
acquittal, the same paper asked: “What heart does not feel mockery of such a trial? … He
did shoot his brother-in-law, and not all the courts, juries, and arguments can destroy that
fact.”164
Social connections between a defendant and a jury could be naturally occurring.
Both were local and some overlap was not surprising. However, links between the jury
and defendant could also be manufactured, through the practice of jury packing. Packed
juries were a point of major concern during the 1849 convention.165 Garret Davis
described a Nicholas County defendant who “had his friends hovering about the court
house, and five of them were put upon the jury.”166 As a result, he was found guilty of
manslaughter instead of murder, avoiding the noose.167
The southern honor code influenced the crimes and trials in Kentucky. However, a
defendant bound to act by honor was automatically acquitted. While national newspapers
occasionally explained acquittals as a consequence of “western chivalry,” local sources
had more complicated views.168 For example, one convention member summarized the
problem: “If you give a man money, united with strong family friends and influence, he
may at will laugh to scorn your courts.” His comments indicated a deep dissatisfaction
with a system beyond the honor code.169 The populist critique within the social
connection explanation of jury nullification paralleled the Masonic complaints in New
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England. Considerations of elitism and wealth intersected with the southern honor code
when Kentuckians sought to understand acts of nullification.

3.2 NULLIFICATION AS AMORAL CHICANERY

Deeply related to the social-connection explanation was the issue of bribery. The
status of wealth might influence jurors, but cash was also persuasive. The attendees of
Kentucky’s 1849 constitutional convention believed that jurors were susceptible to bribes
and that this weakness was an underlying cause of widespread jury nullification.170
Richard D. Ghoulson, a member of the Kentucky State Senate, claimed, “I have known in
my county.... The most cold blooded, deliberate crimes to have been committed that ever
disgraced human nature, and the perpetrators escaped by this diabolical plan, through the
bribery of a juror.”171 Juries were no longer understood to be politically motivated, but
economically motivated. This belief was not unique to Kentucky. A member of the New
York Constitutional Convention of 1846 described jurors as “dissolute loungers, waiting
a chance to obtain a shilling” whose “integrity and judgment no man can confide in, and
who are utterly unfit to decide either the law or the facts of any case.”172
One of the consequences of widespread jury distrust was the denigration of the
jury. Members of the state legislature and newspapers focused on nullifying jurors'
character. Jurors were described as possessing “moral imbecility”; as “miserable
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wretches” and “stool-pigeons”; and as “atrocious.”173 Once the “palladium of liberty,”
jurors were no longer “worthy to sit in a jury box.”174 One convention member recalled
the prosecution of a gambling operation, where seven of the jury members had been
frequent visitors.175 The jury acquitted. A revolutionary interpretation of the event might
have viewed the gambling laws as government overreach that local citizens stood up
against. However, by the nineteenth-century the jurors were as guilty as the criminal
defendant.

3.3 NULLIFICATION AS AN EMOTIONAL RESPONSE

The nineteenth-century understanding of nullification was increasingly
preoccupied with the jury’s emotional motivations. Acts of nullification were explained
as a consequence of unchecked passion. The revolutionary jury was understood as acting
with controlled political purpose, but the nineteenth-century jury was overcome with
sympathy and compassion or even revenge.
Not every member of the Kentucky Constitutional Convention believed jurors
were bribed wretches. Lawyer and convention attendee, William C. Bullitt rejected
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arguments of jury immorality and explained nullification through jury emotionality. He
argued:
It must always be extremely difficult to convict, capitally, for
almost any offence, not from the want of a proper moral sense
in the community…but from that sympathy and feeling
compassion for our neighbor in distress, common to us all,
which renders us, to some extent, incompetent to mete out to
our acquaintance that even handed justice, which we would do
for a stranger.176
Bullitt understood acts of nullification as a result of sympathy and compassion.
Interestingly, these feelings rendered the jury incompetent to judge one’s neighbors. This
is a reversal of earlier beliefs. The revolutionary jury was praised for its local knowledge
that provided unique insights into the crime and the criminal. For the socio-moral jury,
familiarity was a hindrance to justice. The belief that “even handed justice” needed to be
distant would shape how the judiciary would define its own reserved style of judgment.
The shift to the emotional jury was a national trend. In 1819, the Governor of
Tennessee explained nullification as a result of the “disposition in men...tempered to the
spirit of sympathy and humanity.”177 In 1843, one Connecticut state representative asked,
“How then can the state legislature charge the fault upon the over-sensitive jurors?”178
During New York’s Constitutional Convention of 1846, a representative suggested that
only one in twelve men “would not be swayed by improper feelings.”179 In the late 1840s,
Kentucky commentators noted that juries were possessed by “bad passions” and were
“misled, misdirected, by passion.”180
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The shift turned increasingly negative towards emotion. The emotional jury
transitioned from having sympathy to bad passions. The language used to describe jury
nullification indicated the type of legislative consequences. For example, Tennessee’s
sympathetic jury produced changes in the law. The state instituted new criminal codes to
appease its sensitive jurors.181 On the other hand, the laws suggested in the Kentucky
Constitutional Convention of 1849 focused on methods to reign in juries’ bad passions.
One suggested policy was to increase the number of peremptory challenges available to
prosecutors.182 While the shift to an emotional understanding of nullification was
universal, the exact consequences were time and place specific.

3.4 THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY JUDICIARY

The adoption of a socio-moral framework did not happen separately from the
evolution of the court and the cultural shift provides insight to the court-focused
narrative. The major nullification cases of the nineteenth-century (Battiste, Morris,
Porter, and Anthes) were products of the same cultural environment. The concept of the
emotional, socially connected, corruptible jury shaped the judicial opinions, the law, and
judicial identity. This section places the major nullification cases into the larger cultural
context.
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United States v. Battiste was the first American criminal case that held that juries
did not have the right to nullify. In the 1835 opinion, future Supreme Court justice,
Joseph Story rejected the notion that the jury had “the moral right to decide the law
according to their own notions, or pleasure.”183 Justice Story denied a “moral right” not a
political right because he was operating under the socio-moral framework. He did not
conceive of nullification as a political right needing to be refuted. Also, he used the
words “notion” and “pleasure” to describe the criteria for jury nullification. It implied
impulsivity, indulgence, and rashness: qualities of an emotional jury. Justice Story
invoked the emotional jury to affirm a rational, cool-headed judicial identity.
Justice Story continued:
This Is the right of every citizen; and it is his only
protection. If the jury were at liberty to settle the law for
themselves, the effect would be, not only that the law itself
would be most uncertain, from the different views, which
different juries might take of it; but in case of error, there
would be no remedy or re-dress by the injured party; for the
court would not have any right to review the law as it had
been settled by the jury.184
This was a major reframing from the eighteenth-century mentality. Discussion of
revolutionary nullification focused on the rights of the jury. Nineteenth-century
nullification interfered with the rights of the defendant. The revolutionary jury was once
considered the only hope to “save any future printer from the fangs of power.”185 Yet,
Story argued that only exclusive judicial control of the law could offer “protection.”
Story also revealed how jury nullification created identity issues for the judiciary. He
noted that acts of nullification were not reviewable, which meant there was nothing for
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the court to do. When juries decided questions of facts and law, nullification made the
judiciary obsolete. It was an obstacle to judicial power and purpose.
Finally, Justice Story argued that “Every person accused as a criminal has a right
to be tried according to the law of the land . . . and not by the law as a jury may
understand it, or choose, from wantonness, or ignorance, or accidental mistake, to
interpret it.”186 Again, Story engaged with a socio-moral framework to describe
nullification. Wantonness, ignorance, and mistake served as counterpoints for a judicial
identity of prudence and wisdom.
Supreme Court Justice Benjamin R. Curtis, sitting as a trial judge in United States
v. Morris (1840), repeated Story’s argument that the court “protects” against “corruption
or prejudice.”187 The influence of the socio-moral framework was clear. He understood
nullification to be motivated by personal emotion and social connection and that juries
were corruptible and capricious. Justice Curtis further argued that because judges
provided their reasonings in public opinions, there was “very little danger of the laws
being wrested to the purposes of injustice.”188 Justice Curtis was delineating a counter
judicial approach to deciding issues of law: incorruptible, unprejudiced, and just. He also
described the jury as “the body of the people, with no reference to their qualifications to
decide questions of law.”189 The revolutionary jury was armed with local knowledge to
protect against government overreach. Justice Curtis’ jury was provincial and required
the “highest safeguards of the citizen,” judicial oversight.190 It was the socio-moral
framework’s break with the revolutionary jury that allowed the pivot.
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Five years after Morris, Chief Justice of Massachusetts' Supreme Court, Lemuel
Shaw declared that juries have no authority to resolve questions of law.191 Porter became
the precedent relied on by all future cases, including Sparf. Shaw argued the jury’s real
“moral obligation” was not to follow its conscience but the judge’s instructions.192 He
stated that ending nullification would “make the law paramount and supreme over all the
powers and influences of will or passion, of interest or prejudice.”193 His arguments
reflected the themes of the socio-moral framework. Shaw’s jury had social connections
and powerful emotions that were simply contrary to “the law.” Shaw was setting up a
powerful dichotomy. On one side was passion, prejudice and juries. On the other was the
law and the judiciary.
Porter aroused a great deal of opposition and its critics re-opened the issue at the
Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1853. One representative summarized the
position of Battiste, Morris, and Porter as an assumption that “all judges are pure, that all
juries are corrupt-that all judges are wise, and that juries are always ignorant.”194
(Considering Shaw’s last comment. This summation was pretty accurate.) He rejected
Shaw’s position with a historical argument; “I appeal to it confidently…when kings were
cruel and courts were corrupt, the jury remained kind and pure.”195
The socio-moral framework even influenced those that wished to criticize judges.
One Massachusetts State Representative described the judge as a “man who sits upon the
bench, and who has no sympathy, of fellow feeling, nothing in common with the
191
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people.”196 The descriptors of “sympathetic” and “kind” show how deeply ingrained the
socio-moral understanding had become. During the Revolution, judges were threatening
tyrants, now critics simply called out the judiciary’s lack of sympathy. The
pro-nullification supporters, like the judiciary, had adopted emotion-based language. The
diversity of opinions and variety of judicial and non-judical adopters of the changing
language surrounding nullification rejects the court-focused narrative. The reframing was
not simply court-led, but part of a larger cultural shift.
Members of the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1853 did not
universally support nullification, but the critics embraced the same framework. One
lyrical commentator believed the “danger” was that the “currents of popular feeling,
when strongly moved, will sweep away the bench, like bubbles on a swollen flood.”197 He
was concerned about the passions of an unemotional jury. Similarly, another commentator
feared that a “fair and impartial trial” could be jeopardized by “periods of public
excitement.”198 Each description of impassioned juries was balanced by the reserved
sensibilities of the judiciary with the “support of reason and judgement.”199 Ultimately,
the detractors lost, for a moment. This convention amended the constitution to include the
right for juries to decide questions of law in criminal trials.200

196

Massachusetts. Constitutional Convention (1853), Official report of the debates and proceedings in the
State Convention, 547.
197
Massachusetts. Constitutional Convention (1853), Official report of the debates and proceedings in the
State Convention, 547.
198
Massachusetts. Constitutional Convention (1853), Official report of the debates and proceedings in the
State Convention, 541.
199
Massachusetts. Constitutional Convention (1853), Official report of the debates and proceedings in the
State Convention, 541.
200
Massachusetts. Constitutional Convention (1853), The constitutional propositions, adopted by the
convention of delegates, assembled at Boston, on the first Wednesday of May, A.D. 1853: and submitted to
the people for their ratification with an address to the people of Massachusetts, (Boston: Published by
order of the Convention, White & Potter, state printers, 1853).

60

The final significant nullification case in this period was Commonwealth v Anthes.
Chief Justice Shaw’s ruling in Anthes rendered the convention’s changes meaningless. He
disingenuously interpreted the amendment granting juries the right “to decide by a
general verdict both the fact and the law involved in the issue” as a confirmation of the
position in Porter.201 Then, he outrageously concluded that any other interpretation of the
amendment was “beyond the scope of legitimate legislative power, repugnant to the
Constitution, and, of course, inoperative and void.”202 For Shaw, the jury was the purview
of the judiciary.
Justice Shaw explained that questions of law must be determined by the judiciary
because they required “not only wisdom and integrity, but the most thorough experience
and skill in law as a science.”203 The judiciary was all the things the impetuous,
corruptible, novice jury was not. One of the common explanations for the end of jury
independence was the growth of professionalism within the legal field. Shaw’s comment
about “law as a science” certainly can be understood in that light.
Justice Shaw hammered on the specialized learning needed to answer questions of
law. He argued that the law required the “most accurate and complete knowledge both of
the written and unwritten law” and an “equally thorough and practical knowledge of
constitutional law…derived from records and adjudged cases, ancient and modern, and
books of acknowledged authority.”204 The growing complexity of law is a second
explanation for the decline of jury power in the court-focused narrative. In the
nineteenth-century, American law became more complicated and less intuitive. As a
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result, it demanded expert decision-makers. The explanation portrays the decline of legal
pragmatism and neglects the obvious role of power.
By the time of Anthes decision, a more fundamental development had already
occurred. The very conception of nullification had shifted so dramatically that the role of
juries changed. The jury’s valued local knowledge became parochial bias. A political
body that represented the people became a social body too interconnected with its
community to be objective. The revolutionary spirit became “bad passions.” The
nineteenth-century judicial identity of integrity, authority and reason was possible
because it was no longer claimed by the jury.
The court’s discussion of the judge-jury relationship had a curious gendered
aspect. In Anthes, Judge Shaw appeared to use the doctrine of separate spheres in his
discussion of the role of the jury.
The power of deciding fact and law is wisely divided; that the authority
to decide questions of law is placed in a body well qualified, by a
suitable course of training, to decide all questions of law; and another
body, well qualified for the duty, is charged with deciding all questions
of fact, definitively; and whilst each, within its own sphere, performs
the duty entrusted to it.205
Not only did Shaw employ the logic of discrete roles, he used the actual phrase “within
its own sphere.” A Pennsylvania judge described the “manly determination on the part of
the court to render such a judgement.”206 Elsewhere, this concept of “manly judgment”
was described as “cool, retired, deliberate.”207 The same language the judiciary used to
describe itself in nullification cases. It was indicative of the judiciary working to establish
its own position within the legal hierarchy and the metaphor of existing hierarchies
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proved useful. The paternalism of nineteenth-century social structures was recreated in
the entirely male-space of the nineteenth-century courtroom.

3.5 NINETEENTH-CENTURY CERTAINTY

Every major nullification case, in the nineteenth-century, was concerned about
certainty. Justice Story complained that nullification meant “the law itself would be most
uncertain.”208 Justice Curtis denied juries law-finding power in order “to secure a
uniform and consistent interpretation of the laws.”209 Justice Shaw insisted that the
“freedom of the citizen, and the peace and good order of society” was dependent on
certainty in the law.210 Legislators were also concerned about “cruel and mischievous
uncertainty.”211 The critics of nullification were concerned that if juries determined the
law "their rules of decision . . . and consequently the rights of individuals would
necessarily be uncertain and fluctuating."212 Jury nullification was always unpredictable.
The critics were also redefining certainty for the nineteenth-century. The
revolutionary jury had promised its own certainty. It was security against arbitrary
government action. Shannon Stimson saw the influence of Locke in the revolutionary
understanding of certainty. She argued that Locke “offered not a structure of government
to be copied, but an understanding of the limitations of human reason and its relationship
208
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to law; an attitude of uncertainty about unlimited lawmaking power.”213 Juries served as a
safeguard against the uncertainty of government power. The revolutionary jury stood in
opposition to unlimited lawmaking power by nullifying government overreach. Morton
Horwitz explained: “Since the problem of maintaining legal certainty before the
Revolution was largely identified with preventing political arbitrariness, juries were
rarely charged with contributing to the unpredictability or uncertainty of the legal
system.”214
The new nineteenth-century certainty was different. Pro-certainty factions offered
the judiciary as security against arbitrary jury action. Juries were now the threat to
certainty. Horwitz defined the new certainty as the priority of commercial interests that
valued predictability. The judicial desire for legal uniformity was a consequence of
changes in capitalism and the market revolution. Certainty will be discussed extensively
in the next chapter.

3.6 CONCLUSION
How nullification was understood in the nineteenth-century changed. Acts of
nullification were explained in previously unseen ways: by the jury’s social connections,
emotions, and moral character. This shift in understanding affected the law and the
judiciary. Ultimately, this chapter also provides an alternative explanation for how
political rights are lost. At first glance, it appears like the cases of Sparf, Porter, Anthes,
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Battiste, and Morris chipped away over the course of a century the jury’s right to nullify.
However, the act was already largely depoliticized when it reached the courts. The final
chapter of this work will use a case study to more intensely consider the relationship
between judicial identity, the law, and the new nineteenth-century socio-moral
explanations of nullification.
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CHAPTER 4. ALABAMA: A CASE STUDY

I have made three major arguments. First, the cultural understanding of
nullification shifted from a political framework to socio-moral framework in the early
nineteenth-century. Second, this shift influenced how the judiciary self-defined. Third,
this shift shaped the laws regarding jury independence.
The scope of this work has provided an intentionally wide perspective. The
previous chapters have explored cases of nullification in the South, the Mid-Atlantic, and
New England states. This is a departure from other scholarship on nullification which has
focused more on individual regions, states, and localities. Again, this difference comes
down to the types of sources used in the court-focused narrative compared to this work.
As the name implies, the court-focused narrative focuses on court cases and judicial
opinions. These sources come with an internal jurisdictional organization, federalism.
Federalism results in jurisdictional-specific laws, rulings, and policies that are not
beholden to any other jurisdictions’ laws, rulings, and policies. This is part of the internal
logic of American law. Since the court-focused narrative concentrates on the court, it has
often worked within these jurisdictions, creating a hyper-regionalized scholarship on
nullification.

In contrast, my queries begin with the public response to the spectacle of
nullification and how it processed meaning from those events. I am not beholden to strict
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regionality. The common shifts in language seen in Pennsylvania, Kentucky, New York,
Massachusetts indicate that regionalism is less significant to address questions on
nullification. Going beyond regional analysis was necessary to identify national
commonality. Even more importantly, my approach is centered on the understanding that
laws do not form or function within the isolation of its own internal and self-referential
logic.
This chapter takes a different approach. Chapter 4 is a case study of criminal
nullification cases in Alabama from 1824 to 1839. I delineate the relationship between
the law, judicial identity, and the socio-moral understanding of nullification and apply
what I have suggested in the previous chapters: the socio-moral framework emerged in
the early nineteenth-century and led to changes in the law and in the judiciary. I
demonstrate how nullification was understood within a socio-moral framework in
Alabama; spurred a penitentiary reform movement in the law; and established the jury as
the antithesis of “certainty” which allowed the judiciary to embrace the quality. I argue
that the pivot from a political framework towards a socio-moral framework should be
considered along with the judge-led actions and judge-oriented processes that dominate
the court-focused explanations of the law’s transformation in the nineteenth-century.
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4.1 NULLIFICATION IN ALABAMA

On October 7, 1830, Logan Brandon shot Gideon Northcut in broad daylight, in
front of one-hundred witnesses in Madison County, Alabama. Brandon stood less than a
dozen feet away and fired three shots at his target, a member of the state legislature and a
Colonel in the militia. Two shots hit and instantly killed Northcut. The third hit and killed
a bystander. At his trial, Brandon openly admitted to the shooting. He described the act as
an outburst of unplanned passion to defend his reputation and his sister’s honor. He
claimed Northcut had spread a rumor and he had responded.215 After retiring for three
hours, the jury found him not-guilty. Brandon avoided the hangman’s noose because of
jury nullification.216
Perhaps the most extraordinary fact about the Brandon case is that it was not all
that extraordinary. In the first half of the nineteenth century, jury nullification was
common practice in Alabama criminal cases. One newspaper, the Huntsville Southern
Advocate, explained, “Juries refused to convict, and indeed ‘you can never convict unless
you have twelve butchers for a jury and a Jeffries [sic]’” (the ‘Hanging Judge’ under
James II).217 Alabama juries were hesitant to convict “Knowing that they might be
sending a man to the gallows” under a severe penal code. Both descriptions suggest that
nullification was rampant and was understood as a moral dilemma for jurors.
215
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How rampant is unclear. However, there is quantifiable, though imperfect,
evidence of widespread nullification: acquittal rates. For example, in Madison County, in
the 1820s and 1830s, 37% of murder trials and 42% of theft trials ended in acquittal. Not
every acquittal is a nullification. Undoubtedly, some are due to a lack of convincing
evidence, reasonable doubt, or acceptance of a proper defense. Yet, when these
percentages are considered within the context of other crimes’ rates, they provide
convincing evidence of nullification. The acquittal rate for gambling was only 9% and it
was 10% for selling liquor without a license. Accepting the Huntsville Southern
Advocate’s explanation of jury revulsion of “the gallows,” may help explain the
difference. Burglary, larceny, and murder were capital crimes.218 But, gambling and the
unlicensed sale of liquor were punished by fines or time in the stocks. In this disparity of
conviction rates, the margins of jury nullification become more apparent.219
The public was fully aware of the prevalence of jury nullification. Newspapers
across the state in Mobile, Selma, Tuscaloosa, Huntsville, and Jacksonville, all
acknowledged its pervasiveness.220 Jurors also acknowledged the problem. An 1833
grand jury in Madison County and an 1838 grand jury in Montgomery County
spontaneously wrote to the Alabama state legislature about their concerns over
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nullification.221 The grand juries and the newspaper editorials recognized that juries
refused to convict the obviously guilty because they balked at the severity of punishments
available under the law. And, both supported the same solution, easing the severity with
the establishment of a penitentiary system.

4.2 NULLIFICATION AND THE LAW: THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
PENITENTIARY REFORM
In the 1790’s, social reformers began advocating for the replacement of
retributive corporal and capital penalties for a system of criminal rehabilitation through
extended prison sentences. The penitentiary system, as the reform was called, was a new
practice of punishment. Immediately after the Revolution, penitentiaries began to appear
in the United States, a result of the new republic’s evolving position of penal methods.222
Penitentiary reform had a mini-renaissance in the 1820’s, beginning in the Northeast and
spreading into the South and Midwest over the next decade.223 When the penitentiary
reform movement hit Alabama, it served as a discourse on existing nullification practices.
The ensuing debates were less about the movement’s original criminal reform and more
221
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about jury reform. The Alabama legislature was almost singularly preoccupied with how
the penitentiary might address the prevalence of nullification. The legislature believed if
they gave jail time to offenders rather than the death penalties, jurors would convict. As a
result, the legislative debates on reform are an ideal source for understanding
contemporary beliefs on the role of juries and the nature of nullification. The debates are
also evidence on how nullification was shaping criminal law.
The Alabama penitentiary reform movement began in 1824 when Representative
Quin Morton proposed a resolution to instruct the Alabama House Ways and Means
committee to “inquire into the expediency of establishing a state penitentiary.”224 The
motion, suggesting only an inquiry, was decidedly rejected: 21 Yeas to 32 Nays. Almost
annually, for fifteen years, penitentiary reform would be discussed, debated and then
dismissed by the legislature.
The penitentiary movement gained traction in the legislature when it was
connected to the problem of rampant jury nullification. According to reform advocates,
juries were responding to a draconian system of punishment and argued that if the system
was changed so would jury verdicts. In 1830, Governor Gabriel Moore supported the
adoption of a penitentiary system emphasizing the graduated punishment. To convince
the skeptics in the legislature, he explained how nullification was a direct consequence of
the existing code. He noted that “The sense of its atrocity (the criminal punishment)
sometimes draws fourth a sympathy for the culprit or offender, who seems to fall a
victim, rather at the alter of revenge, than at the shrine of his country’s good.”225 The five
governors that followed Gabriel Moore, were enthusiastic supporters of penitentiary
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reform who consistently linked reform with nullification.226 An 1832 House of
Representatives committee report echoed this position, recommending a penitentiary
because “our cruel and sanguinary laws are so seldom enforced.”227 Reformers presented
the penitentiary as a solution to jury nullification.
At least one state senator’s understanding of jury nullification went beyond the
theoretical. Alabama Senator Rufus K. Anderson was rescued by a jury’s acquittal in the
face of convincing evidence. Anderson had announced he was going to kill his
brother-in-law, Thomas P. Taul, traveled to Winchester, Tennessee, and then shot Taul
three times in the abdomen. The shooting occurred in the street, in the middle of the day,
with multiple witnesses. After the initial attack, Anderson yelled to Thomas Taul’s
approaching father, “My name is Anderson and I’ll kill you too.” 228 Anderson clearly
murdered Taul, and yet the Franklin County jury’s “not guilty” verdict took only an
hour.229 It was an obvious case of nullification.
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Like Logan Brandon, Anderson claimed he was defending his sister’s honor,
Taul’s deceased wife. Micah Taul, the victim’s father, maintained, “The verdict was not
founded upon the evidence, and the settled law of the land, to be found in the books; nor
upon the law laid down by the judge.”230 In his memoirs, written twenty years later, he
blamed a judge that “could bend him at will by flattering his vanity”231 and jurors that
“had been talked to before the trial, by corrupt men, and their opinions fixed” in a court
system with “no law to punish a murder.”232 For the grief-ridden father, nullification had
not occurred because the law was too harsh, but because of moral failings of a vain judge
and corrupt jury. He explained the nullification through the lens of the socio-moral
framework. Anderson, the acquitted killer, with new and intimate familiarity with
nullification, returned to his seat in the state Senate. (Perhaps, it was his own nullification
rescue that led him to vote against the penitentiary bill five times.233) This case is
evidence of the depoliticized language of nullification and the direct connections
Alabama legislators had with nullification.
In 1834, a decade into the penitentiary debate, the legislature decided to hold a
statewide referendum on the penitentiary.234 The act made it “the duty of sheriffs and
coroners to take the sense of the people in relation to the establishment of a
penitentiary”235 Voters “overwhelmingly” rejected it.236 25,009 out of 37,213 voters
opposed reform.237 Multiple counties' votes were between 92% and 96% opposed.238
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Vocal reform proponent Governor John Gayle admitted defeat; “The question has been
settled in a manner, and by a tribunal, that commands implicit acquiescence.”239
The public’s apparent opposition did not end the debate. Only one year after the
referendum, bills to establish a penitentiary were reintroduced in the House.240 In 1839,
against the wishes of the majority of voting citizens, the Alabama House of
Representatives voted to establish a penitentiary.241 The Senate, without Rufus Anderson
who by then had been beaten to death with the butt of a musket in 1834, concurred and
Governor A.P. Bagby’s approval shortly followed. 242 The penitentiary bill established a
state penitentiary, called for a commission to oversee construction, and authorized the
election of three individuals to write a new penal code suitable for a penitentiary
system.243
Why did the state establish a penitentiary after voters had recently and
overwhelmingly rejected the project? Robert Ward and David Rogers observed the
“absence of any pattern” and suggested the breakdown of the yeas and nays will cause
“historians of Alabama” to “ponder...with some misgivings and little enlightenment.” 244
In the final vote, Representatives from Sumter and Marengo counties supported the bill,
while their counterparts in the Senate abstained. Congressmen in the House, representing
Lowndes and Pike, supported the penitentiary while those counties’ senators opposed. 245
Counties with major towns supported the bill, with the glaring exception of Mobile.246
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Even the state’s traditional split between Black Belt planters and North Alabama’s small
farmers was not apparent.247 The vote is such an inexplicable outlier that Ward and
Rogers joked: J. Mills Thorton’s thorough book on Alabama political parties started in
1840 solely to avoid attempting to explain the 1839 vote.248
Perhaps, historians have not been able to explain the vote politically because the
issue was not understood politically by its contemporaries. For fifteen years the public
and private debate over nullification had been framed in socio-moral terms. It was
understood as a moral question between “barbarous” or “civilized,” “savage” or
“modern.”249 If it had still been an issue of politics, legislators would have been less
motivated to vote for an expensive and unpopular law that lacked machine backing from
either party. Reform required more than the mere construction of a penitentiary. The
criminal laws would have to change to permit penitentiary sentences.

4.3 NULLIFICATION AND THE LAW: THE CRIMINAL CODE

The penitentiary system is not just the physical prison, but a series of laws that set
prison sentences, as opposed to capital or corporal sentences, as punishment. Alabama
required a new criminal code that sanctioned long-term prison sentences as an alternative
punishment. The old code, the Act of the Punishment of Crimes and Misdemeanors, was
enacted in 1807 by the Alabama-Mississippi Territory. Upon statehood in 1819, the code
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remained in effect.250 The 1807 code, rooted in English common law, had twenty-one
capital crimes and relied on fines and corporal punishment for lesser crimes.251 The
severity and frequency of corporal and capital punishment was what the unruly juries
were rejecting and what reform was meant to correct.
After the Alabama legislature voted for the construction of a penitentiary, it began
reforming the criminal code. In 1836, the State passed an act that reduced the number of
capital crimes for white citizens and for free people of color. Arson, robbery, burglary,
counterfeiting and forgery no longer carried the death penalty.252 On January 9, 1841, the
legislature approved a new penal code suitable for the new penitentiary system. Corporal
punishment was essentially eliminated for white citizens. For example, under the old
code, the punishment for horse stealing was thirty-nine lashes, face or hand branding, and
12 months in county jail.253 It was now a three to seven year penitentiary sentence.254
Most remaining capital offenses were eliminated. Those capital offenses that remained,
homicide, treason, crimes related to supporting slave insurrection, now carried the option
of life imprisonment.
The new code passed with notable resistance. While the Senate approved the
code quickly, it met “decided hostility” from the House.255 The House added extensive
amendments designed to further reduce the new punishments of the proposed code.

250

Alabama State Constitution of 1819, Sec.19.
Statutes of the Mississippi Territory, 1807. See King, “The Origins of Felony Jury Sentencing in the
United States,” 990.
252
1836 Ala. Acts, Act No. 48. See Also Beck v. State, 396 So. 2d 645 (1980).
253
Mississippi., Toulmin, H., Northwest Territory., United States. (1807). The statutes of the Mississippi
Territory. Natchez: Printed by Samuel Terrell, printer to the Mississippi Territory. An Act for the
Punishments of Crimes and Misdemeanors. Sec. 19
254
Act Regulating Punishments under the Penitentiary System 1841; Ch 3 Sec 62
255
The Independent Mirror, October, 20 1841.
251

76

However, the changes were scrapped when the pressure of adjournment motivated the
House to pass the original version.256
The new code’s detractors viewed the extended sentences in the penitentiary
system as too extreme.257 The most vocal opponents condemned the continued
“severity.”258 However, real reforms had been incorporated. For example, the new code
terminated branding, whipping, and pillory. Nevertheless, the criticism stuck. The new
1841 code, not its predecessor, became known as “the bloody code.”259
One Huntsville newspaper hoped for “future legislation for ameliorating those
penalties which almost every one think too harsh.”260 However, further moderation to the
criminal code did not occur. In 1846, Alabama abandoned the penitentiary system. In its
place, the legislature began leasing the penitentiary building and the labor of its inmates
to the highest bidder.261 This system would remain substantially unmodified until after the
Civil War.262
The first Alabama penitentiary system was short-lived; however, it would have
another more lasting legacy. A major consequence of the new code was that it shifted
greater sentencing privileges to judges. The 1807 code followed the precedents
established in the English common law; jurors set fines and judges determined terms of
imprisonment.263 Since the original code made the majority of crimes capital offenses,
imprisonment, and thereby judges, did not play a major role. For capital crimes, the
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verdict and the sentencing were part of a single decision made solely by the jury. The
entire fate of accused murderers, rapists, traitors, burglars, robbers, counterfeiters, slave
rebellion insurrectionists, forgers, arsonists, and more were exclusively in the hands of
the jury.264
However, the new 1841 penal codes separated the verdict from the sentencing
and created new spaces for judicial intervention. This was a consistent consequence of
establishing the penitentiary system. Morris B. Hoffman has noted, “When penitentiaries
became the punishment of choice suddenly sentencers had enormous discretion.”265
Under the 1841 code, the bench would “prescribe the term of imprisonment both in the
penitentiary and county jail, unless it shall be expressly directed otherwise.”266 Juries
continued to determine fines and the “expressly directed cases”: the remaining capital
crimes; some named misdemeanors267; and seven non-capital felonies.268
On the one hand, this legislative maneuver meant very little for nullification.
Juries could still nullify any part of the new penal code with a not-guilty verdict. In his
final annual address as governor, Governor Bagby cautioned the legislature that the entire
penitentiary system’s success was dependent on the government “taking care never to
exceed, in the way of punishment, the bounds of enlightened and virtuous public
opinion.”269 For Bagby, the jury remained a powerful entity, still fully capable of
disruption.
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However, a milder code opened the door to further divide power between the
judge and the jury. The old code had twenty-one capital crimes. For capital crimes, you
cannot separate the verdict from the sentence. A guilty verdict means a death sentence.
While the law considered sentencing a question of law and guilt is a question of fact,
juries controlled both for capital crimes. Once, milder punishments were introduced the
two could be parsed and many of the new sentencing powers were explicitly granted to
the judiciary by the new code. As a question of law, punishment was expressly given to
the judiciary by statute. Nullification in capital cases was still within the jury’s purview
of the bundled verdict and death sentence. Now, nullification could be redefined as a
greater breach of judicial authority to sentence.

4.4 THE LANGUAGE OF NULLIFICATION

There is a clear distinction between the overtly political language of the
revolutionary jury discussed in chapter two and the socio-moral language used in the
Alabama penitentiary debate. A close-text examination of the language of nullification
indicates a shift away from an overtly political framework to a framework. Alexander
Hamilton classified nullification as a “duty”270 while an Alabama House of
Representative committee called it “the feelings of the people.”271 In 1804, New York
Supreme Court Justice James Kent referred to nullification as a “lawful and rightful
power.”272 In 1832, Alabama Governor Gayle described nullification as the “abiding
sense of tenderness and justice in the breasts of juries, that will rescue the greater part of
270
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those who are sought to be made their victims.”273 Three noteworthy patterns emerged in
the language used to describe acts of nullification. First, nullification was understood as
an act of moral judgment. Second, the emotions of the jury were highlighted. Third,
nullification was recognized as part of the spirit of the age, divorcing it from its historical
roots.
The decision to nullify was understood as a moral determination. When juries
acted, they: “rescue[d] the greater part of those who are sought to be made their victims”
and “satisf[ied] and quiet[ed] their consciences.”274 Sixty years after revolution, juries
were simply too “enlightened and virtuous” to enforce the corporal and capital
punishments required under existing law.275
In early nineteenth-century Alabama, the language of nullification indicated a jury
was compelled to act. To nullify was to “suffer the guilty to escape altogether, than to
inflict upon him excessive punishment.”276 This presents the juror as a martyr and
nullification as something a jury must endure because of its humanity. Describing jurors
as “lost in sympathy” created an image of unfocused resignation.277 The enlightened and
virtuous jury was honorable, but lacked the political purpose and vigor of the
revolutionary jury.
The jury’s emotions were often emphasized during the Alabama penitentiary
debates. Nullification was explained as a consequence of “sentiments,”278 “sympathy,”279
and the “sacred principles of humanity and enlightened public benevolence.”280 In a
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similar vein, the Jacksonville Republican observed: “It [the penal code] is revolting to
the better portion of the community, and the consequence is that those who commit a
certain kind of crimes escape unpunished.”281 “Revolting” is a guttural and sensory-based
language that underscored the jury’s emotional response. The language of emotion is a
shift from the political language of authority. This shift created opportunities for the
judiciary to embrace the language of authority.
Finally, nullification was recognized as part of the spirit of the age, divorcing it
from its historical roots. In 1837, Governor McVay advocating for a new penal code,
stated, “Whipping branding and the pillory are punishments too barbarous in their
character, and too revolting to the sensibilities of civilized society to secure certainty in
any case.”282 He made a clear distinction between the “barbarous” past and the “civilized”
present. Governor Gayle made a similar argument, comparing the past “savage society”
to “modern civilization and refinement.”283 Governor Bagby posited, the old code did not
match the intelligence or virtue of “the age in which we live.”284 Alabama House of
Representatives penitentiary committee also concluded, the old code “exhibit[ed] all the
ferocity and blood thirsty disposition of the age in which they originated, the
former[jurors] share all the mildness peculiarly characteristic of the present.”285
Alabama’s “spirit of the age” was part of a larger change in the concept of time in
the nineteenth-century. Jerome Hamilton Buckley argued that the Victorians possessed an
unusual degree and a heightened emotionality in their awareness of time, confirming
John Stuart Mill's suggestion that “his own generation had a quite unprecedented
281
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awareness of time, and of itself in time."286 Perhaps the temporal nullification language is
a product of the “idea of progress, the serious interest in history, the medievalizing spirit,
and the awareness of the new cosmic time-scale enforced by geology, together with the
prophetic voices of doom and decline.”287 However, its immediate consequence is to
further distance the savage environment of the revolutionary jury to the civilized
enlightened jury.
“Spirit of the age” is a concept that was closely associated with the Alabama
nullification cases that erases the extended history of American nullification. The Voice of
Sumter noted, “Every man of observation can perceive from the number of trials and
acquittals of capital offenses which take place in our country, that the spirit of the age is
rapidly arraying itself in favor of the life of the criminal.”288 This mentality severed the
contemporary actions rooted in tender emotions of the age from the political acts of the
revolutionary juries. The association of nullification with the “the present” was a failure
to see continuity with the revolutionary jury and helped allow for the reimagining of the
history of nullification within the judiciary.

4.5 CERTAINTY

One term of particular significance dominated the discussions of nullification:
certainty. “Certainty” functioned as a kind of shorthand, employed to explain the
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relationship between the penitentiary and nullification. Governor Hugh McVay uses the
term in his concise explanation of the criminal code’s brutality; “Death is too sanguinary
ever to secure certainty of punishment (my emphasis).”289 The uncertainty was caused by
jury nullification, and to a lesser extent, the governor’s power to pardon: “ the sympathy
of the jury, the humanity of the court; and the lenity of the Executive.”290 Reformers
concluded penitentiary reform would make convictions certain. Reform advocates argued
that a new penal system, more in line with juror values, would mean the return of regular
conviction. The pervasiveness of certainty discourse is an indication of the centrality of
nullification in the debates. The legislative history is filled with “certainty” advocacy.
With two exceptions, every committee report about penitentiary reform within the House
and Senate journal from 1824-1839 used the term “certainty.”291 Each annual Governor’s
address to the legislature by Hugh McVay292, Clement Clomer Clay293, and Arthur P.
Bagby294 used “certainty/uncertainty” language to discuss reform.
At times, certainty took on a larger significance than creating a cooperative jury. It
was described as “the most important principles of criminal justice”295 and a “preventive
of crime.”296 In 1837, Governor McVay description imbued certainty with a particularly
empirical quality; “confinement and hard labor can be so limited or extended both in their
Duration and degree, as to furnish to juries the means of assigning with accuracy to every
species of crime.297 Governor McVay’s description rendered punishment to a science and
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the penitentiary system as a tool for juries. Governor McVay continued, “this will and
must secure certainty of adequate punishment; and that will deter offenders and suppress
crime.”298 He made clear that the promotion of certainty was not a rejection of the jury
exercising judgment, but an outcome. And again, certainty appeared as part of a larger
theory of deterrence. However, certainty is in competition with the uncertainty of true
jury independence and when lawmakers hold the value of certainty higher than the value
of completely independent judgment of the jury, the jury loses.
When Alabama lawmakers evoked certainty, they were knowingly tapping into a
larger history behind the term. “Certainty” was critical to the writings of Cesare Beccaria
and his theory of crime deterrence. Outlined in his seminal 1764 essay, On Crime and
Punishment and pirated from the works Montesquieu, Diderot, D'Alembert, Helvetusy
and Hume, he advocated for penal reform.299 His arguments were grounded in
Enlightenment principles like “rationality, proportionality, legality, lenience, and the rule
of law.”300 Beccaria saw certainty, celerity, and severity as the three qualities of
punishment. The best method to deter crime was to make punishment absolutely certain.
In theory, if punishment was absolutely certain, it did not have to be severe to be
successful. “Certainty” was conceptual to Beccaria. While he proposed concrete practices
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like simplifying the elements of a crime,301 “unswerving judicial severity,”302 and more
street lighting303, “certainty” remained a philosophical abstraction, not a methodology.304
Alabama’s penitentiary supporters were unquestionably invoking Beccaria in their
use of “certainty.” Early nineteenth-century America had multiple possible points of
contact with Beccaria’s work. Voltaire's commentary on On Crimes and Punishments was
translated into English and widely read in the United States.305 Also, Sir William
Blackstone’s “Of the Nature of Crimes, and their Punishment” cited Beccaria when he
discussed the penitentiary.306 Blackstone, who American jurists “cited as often as the
Constitution” was the “Southern legal profession’s patron saint.”307 Alabama’s legislature,
consisting mostly of lawyers, would have been undoubtedly familiar.308 The historical
record also shows more than one-third of American libraries from 1777 to 1790
contained a copy of On Crimes and Punishments.309 Perhaps the clearest evidence is
Governor Clay’s 1835 annual address to the legislature. Where Beccaria argued, “The
certainty of a small punishment will make a stronger impression than the fear of one
more severe, if attended with the hopes of escaping,”310 Clay argued, “The certainty of
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receiving a lower degree of punishment would often deter the perpetrator, who is
otherwise led on, relying on its uncertainty, in the various chances of escape.”311
Beccaria references can also be found in the penitentiary debate outside of the
legislature. The Alabama Republican published a letter under the sobriquet “Beccaria”
that criticized Governor Thomas Bibb.312 “Beccaria,” echoing the arguments of the real
Beccaria, condemned the governor's use of clemency because of the need for a
“necessary consequence[s].”313 Ten years later, a newspaper out-spoken in its support of
penitentiary reform, the Huntsville Southern Advocate published an educational series on
“Criminal Jurisprudence” that contained multiple mentions of Cesare Beccaria.314
Despite his popularity, Cesare Beccaria’s “certainty” was distinct from the
certainty in the Alabama penitentiary movement. Within the reform debates, certainty is
always about jury nullification. These debates never raised the issue of more street
lighting or limiting executive clemency powers. Not only did it not simplify the elements
of a crime, when the penitentiary was finally established, an even more complicated
criminal code was enacted. Certainty, while a credible reference to Beccaria, its
interpretation as a full-blooded endorsement of Enlightenment rationality is limited.
The revolutionary jury had been the custodian of certainty for a century.
Nullification’s purpose in the eighteenth-century was to prevent arbitrary government
actions. But in the nineteenth-century, nullifying juries were understood as the dangerous
promoters of arbitrary action. Morton Horwitz explained the changes in how certainty
was conceived as a consequence of instrumentalism: the view that judicial creativity to
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promote good public policy is appropriate. In the revolutionary era, certainty was about
“preventing political arbitrariness.”315 This viewpoint did not blame juries for uncertainty
in the legal system, but capricious colonial judges and administrators. However, the rise
of instrumentalism in the nineteenth-century, reframed capricious judges as creative and
responsive judges. Instrumentalism elevated the contributions of the judge. As a result,
jury interference with those contributions through nullification became more
significant.316 The problems of uncertainty in the nineteenth-century legal system was
squarely a jury issue.
The language of the socio-moral framework created an opportunity for the
judiciary to seize on certainty. The nineteenth-century re-classified nullification as
barbaric, emotion-driven, and without a historical precedent. These qualities were
irreconcilable with certainty. Certainty became the argument for judicial restraint of jury
independence for the rest of the century.

4.6 CONCLUSION

The opening chapter introduced the concept of resonance, where changing one
unit of meaning forces a change within the entire field, and I set an intention to illustrate
“the great resonance of nullification.” This chapter tried to measure the impact of the
redefinition of nullification in one particular case, the Alabama penitentiary movement.
The new socio-moral understanding of nullification shaped the debate on the enactment
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of the penitentiary system. Reform advocates used the passion and emotions associated
with nullification to categorize the new penitentiary system as logical and civilized.
Reformers also latched onto the term “certainty.” While “certainty” already had a
long history with criminal reform, dating at least to Beccaria, it was redefined as a
counter-value to nullification. The socio-moral framework allowed for a series of
choices: nullification or certainty, barbaric or civilized, passion or logic. This framework
shaped the self-image of the judiciary because it placed itself within this binary against
the impassioned jury and on the side of reasoned logic. During the nineteenth-century,
not only did the meaning of nullification change, but the meaning of the law, the judiciary
and certainty itself.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION

Our civilization has decided, and very justly decided that determining the guilt
or innocence of men is a thing too important to be trusted to trained men. If
it wishes for light upon that awful matter, it asks men who know no more law
than I know, but who can feel the things I felt in a jury box. When it wants a
library catalogued, or the solar system discovered, or any trifle of that kind, it
uses up its specialists. But when it wishes anything done that is really serious, it
collects twelve of the ordinary men standing about. The same thing was done,
if I remember right, by the Founder of Christianity.317
G. K. Chesterton

Linguist Benjamin Lee Whorf theorized, the now commonly called “principle of
linguistic relativity,” that language has the potential to shape our perception and
worldviews.318 In the nineteenth century, the language of nullification changed and with it
the perceptions and worldview of juries. The law and the judiciary were shaped by the
new socio-moral language of nullification.
The nineteenth-century battle between the judiciary and the jury over questions of
law seems less relevant today. In the twenty-first-century, neither party tends to decide
questions of law. A 2018 report by the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers found that ninety-seven percent of criminal cases ended by plea deals.319
Essentially, this gives bargaining prosecutors the power to decide both questions of law
317
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and of fact. Likewise, most civil cases are also decided outside of court.320 Opportunities
for acts of nullification are rarer.
However, there are hints that a re-politicisation of jury nullification is possible.
The prison abolition movement has embraced jury nullification as a strategy to combat
mass incarceration. Since the 1990’s, Paul Butler has been advocating jury nullification
as a response to the disparate treatment Black Americans receive by the justice system. 321
Influenced by Butler’s work, Adrien Leavitt has called queering of jury nullification. 322
Leavitt argued that queer people and their allies should nullify all nonviolent crimes to
protest the continued “criminatlization of queer identies” and the disproporte amounts of
violence queer people experience while incarcerated.323
The activists are advocating for a new black, queer, revolutionary jury. Using the
revolutionary jury of the 1770s as a model, activists should work towards politicizing not
just the act of nullification, but the jury as an institution. “We tend to forget that they
were an invention of one generation to serve very specific needs, not the only possible
reaction to social problems...We need not be trapped in inherited answers.”324
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